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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-trust Laws-Sherman Anti-trust Act-Professional Sports
The Supreme Court, in Radovich v. National Football League,1 has
added another professional sport to the growing list2 of those which are
now subject to the provisions of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.3 In this
case, plaintiff, a former professional football player for a member of the
defendant league, sued to collect treble damages under the Clayton Act
4
for a violation by the defendant of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.5 He
alleged that through a method of blacklisting6 he was prevented from
becoming player-coach on a team of an affiliated league,7 and that the
result of this blacklisting was to prevent his employment in organized
football in the United States. He further alleged that the defendant
league scheduled football games in various cities and that a significant
portion of gross receipts was derived from the transmission of these
games over radio and television.8 The defendant contended that the
organization of professional football had been patterned after that of
professional baseball and that since baseball had been exempted from
these laws, the doctrine of stare decisis should apply. The court held
that the business of football came within the meaning of the act and
further stated that the rule which had been established in the earlier
1352 U.S. 445 (1957).
2 Boxing and basketball have been held to constitute interstate commerce with-
in the meaning of the act. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S.
236 (1954); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
'26 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
'38 STAT. 731 (1914); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
226 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952), reading in pertinent parts
as follows:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal ....
"Every person who shall mohopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor . ..."
'This is the commonly used term denoting that a player is no longer eligible to
play.
" The Pacific Coast League, which was not in competition with the National
Football League, offered plaintiff this job, but withdrew the offer when the de-
fendant advised them that plaintiff was blacklisted and that severe penalties would
be imposed on the league if he were signed. 352 U.S. at 448.
' Through the use of these two conveyances, the narratives and the pictures of
the spectacle itself are transmitted across the state lines. For this reason radio
and television have played a major role in the recent decisions for violations of the
anti-trust laws. The first court to recognize their importance was Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
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baseball cases9 was specifically limited to the business of baseball and
was not controlling insofar as any other sport was concerned. 10
Professional sports, and the applicability of the anti-trust laws to
them, have had an interesting history in the courts with results as un-
predictable as the athletic events themselves. The first case to reach the
Supreme Court regarding this subject was Federal Baseball Club v.
National League."' Here, plaintiff had been a member of the Federal
Baseball League. Through a pre-arranged plan of all the members
except plaintiff, this league was dissolved in 1915 and the American and
National Leagues were formed. Plaintiff was not included in either of
these leagues. It brought its action under the Sherman Act alleging
that the defendants had conspired to monopolize the business of giving
baseball exhibitions. The Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the
business was that of giving exhibitions of baseball, that the travel from
state to state in order to give these exhibitions was a mere incident of
the game itself,12 and that personal effort, not related to production,
was not a subject of commerce.'
3
Following this decision, baseball enjoyed more than twenty years
without interference from the courts. But in 1946 efforts to lure players
from the major leagues into the newly formed "Mexican League"
prompted the Commissioner of Baseball to take drastic action, and the
anti-trust problem, which had remained dormant since 1922, was re-
opened. The players who "jumped" to the Mexican League were sus-
pended from organized baseball1 4 for five years.' 5  After playing for a
' Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) ; Federal Baseball Club
v.'National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
10 The dissenting Justices, being unable to distinguish football from baseball,
felt that they were bound by those two decisions. 352 U.S. at 455, 456.
11259 U.S. 200 (1922).
1 That this statement is no longer true cannot be denied. In 1956 the Chicago
White Sox, a baseball team of the American League, spent $91,059 for the trans-
portation of its players to the various cities to participate in these "local exhibi-
tions." Hearings Before the Anti-Trust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 2, at 2044 (1957).
1" Personal effort has now been made the subject of commerce. United States
v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (performances on the stage were held to consti-
tute commerce) ; United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S.
485 (1950) (business of a real estate broker was held to be trade under the act).
1 There are now approximately 400 baseball teams under the jurisdiction of
organized baseball. This includes the American and National Leagues, com-
monly known as the major leagues, and 40 other leagues which compose the minor
leagues. In 1956 there were fifty million spectators who paid one hundred
million dollars to see ten thousand players perform in thirty thousand games. 103
,CoNG. REc. A5325 (daily ed. July 3, 1957).
ajor League Rule 15 was amended to authorize the suspension which the
'Commissioner had already imposed. Hearings, supra note 12, at 61. These rules
'have now been revised and the penalty of five years mandatory ineligibility for a
major league player who jumps his contract or reservation has been completely
eliminated. Hearings, supra note 12, at 122. Rule 15 (d) now provides that
such ineligibility, reinstatement, or complete disqualification, is in the sole dis-
'cretion of the Commissioner of Baseball in the major leagues and the President of
[Vol. 36
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short time in Mexico they applied for re-instatement. When the Com-
missioner refused to lift the suspension, a few of these players turned to
the courts for relief. The most important of these cases was Gardella
v. Chandler,16 in which an action was initiated under the illegality of
restraint clause of the Sherman Act.17 It was dismissed in the district
court for want of anti-trust allegations, but the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit voted two to one to send the case back for a trial
on the merits. Chief Judge Learned Hand stated that if the business
of television and radio, in addition to the personal effort and travel
which had been insufficient in the Federal Baseball case, were enough
to give the business an interstate character, plaintiff had stated a valid
claim for relief. Judge Frank felt that the business was a monopoly
which, with the reserve clause,' 8 possessed characteristics repugnant
to the moral principles of the thirteenth amendment condemning in-
voluntary servitude.19 Judge Chase dissented, saying that he was bound
by the Federal Baseball case, and that radio and television were com-
parable to the telegraph wires which had been used earlier to transmit
reports of the games.2 0  Baseball, not anxious to have the Supreme
Court rule on this decision after such distinguished judges had spoken
in the lower court,21 settled with Gardella.
22
the National Association if it concerns a minor league player. Hearings, supra
note 12, at 1675." 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
1126 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
"s The reserve clause in its present form is a clause in the contract between
the club and a player which gives the club an option on the player's services
in organized baseball for life. The player, once he has signed his first contract,
becomes the sole property of that club and he may be traded or sold by the club
at any time. Furthermore, he is at the mercy of the club owner with regards to
his salary, except that in the major leagues, salaries may not be less than $6,000.00
per year, nor may a player's salary be reduced more than 25% of that which he
earned during the preceding year without his consent. Hearings, supra note 12,
at 1493. Football contracts, contrary to common belief, do not have this per-
petual option to renew. Since 1947, the standard player contract has contained
only a modified reserve clause giving the club the right to renew the contract for
one year at a salary not less than 90% of that received by the player the preceding
year. Nor may the club exercise its option for more than one year. Hearings,
supra note 12, at 2750. But football has a selective draft system which prevents
eligible college players from acting as free agents even before they sign their first
professional contract. The purpose of this system is to produce evenly matched
teams and keener competition so as to give the fans a better exhibition. This
is accomplished by having each team submit a list of the eligible players which
it desires to have, and at a meeting of all the clubs a drawing is held commencing
with the reverse order of the championship standings of the preceding year so that
the team finishing last will get first choice, the team finishing second from last
second choice, and so on until all the eligible players desired have been chosen.
Hearings, supra note 12, at 2580s.
10 172 F.2d at 409. 20 Id. at 404.
21 Commissioner Chandler, being questioned on this subject said, "I do not
think our lawyers thought we could win." Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Coininittee on the iudiciary, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 6, at 290 (1951)."2 Two other suits, involving Max Lanier and Fred Martin, were also settled
19581
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Immediately following these cases, legislation was urged by friends
of baseball to exempt professional sports from the anti-trust laws.
Bills were introduced in the House of Representatives to this effect.
28
A subcommittee was appointed to study organized baseball as a monopoly
power. After extensive hearings in which many persons connected with
baseball testified, the subcommittee submitted a report to Congress
24
which concluded that baseball in all probability could not operate success-
fully without some form of a reserve clause, that they disapproved of
exempting baseball from the anti-trust laws and* recommended that no
legislative action be taken at that time. The subcommitee indicated
that Congress should not pass any legislation until the Supreme Court
had made clear its position.
The chance for the Supreme Court to state its position came in 1953
in Toolson v. New York Yankees.2 5 But in a per curiam decision of one
paragraph, the Court examined the holding in the Federal Baseball
case, the fact that Congress had not passed any legislation on the
subject since that case, and then said: "Without re-examination of the
underlying issues, the judgments below [dismissing the complaint] are
affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs . . . so far as that de-
cision determines that Congress had no intention of including the busi-
ness of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-trust laws." 26  Mr.
Justice Burton wrote a strong dissenting opinion, stating that "the
present popularity of organized baseball increases, rather than dimin-
ishes, the importance of its compliance with standards of reasonableness
comparable with those now required by law of interstate trade or com-
merce."
2 7
It would seem that this decision clearly indicated the Court's
position. Yet in 1955, in a suit initiated by the Government,2 8 the
Court held that professional boxing was within the meaning of the act
and that the Toolson case neither affirmed nor overruled the Federal
Baseball case and was not authority for exempting other businesses.2 9
when Commissioner Chandler reinstated all eighteen players who had violated
the reserve clause of their contracts after three years of their suspension had
been served. Hearings, mtpra note 21, at 343.
22 H.R. 4229, 4230, 4231, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).2 ' H.R. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
-- 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 28346 U.S. at 357.
"'Id. at 364-65.
- United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
2 "It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating factor
between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football or tennis, and
baseball insofar as the conduct of the sport is relevant to the criteria or considera-
tions by. which the Sherman Law becomes applicable to a 'trade or commerce.'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in United States v. International Boxing Club,
348 U.S. 236, 248 (1955).
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Earlier, in United States v. Shubert,30 the Court had stated that Toolson
was a narrow application of stare decisis.
The only other professional sport which has been ruled on is basket-
ball. In a district court decision,3 1 it was held that professional basket-
ball as conducted by the defendant on a multi-state basis caused this
sport to be subject to regulation by the Sherman Act. Here again, the
sale of radio and television rights was given great weight in reaching
the decision.
The present situation places the Court in an unenviable position.
As a result of its decisions, baseball, the originator of the reserve clause
and agreements among clubs to blacklist, and whose organization has
expanded to the point that it embraces every section of the United
States, is exempt from the anti-trust laws. Football and basketball,
whose organizations were patterned after baseball, and which are rela-
tively small enterprises when compared to that sport, are not favored
by such an exemption. The Court recognized that its decisions might
be considered inconsistent in the Radovich case when it said: "If this
ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer,
aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we con-
sidering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate
we would have no doubts."3 2 There is, however, some justification for
the method the Court has used in handling the problem. When the
Federal Baseball case was decided, the Court was dealing with a problem
of congressional intent. It was decided that baseball was not intended
to be covered by the anti-trust laws. After a long period of inaction
by Congress, there was good reason for the Court to affirm its stand
in the Toolson case. But in dealing with other professional sports,
the Court is free to apply stare decisis narrowly and approach the prob-
lem more realistically, in accordance with changed conditions.
Congress is making another attempt to solve the problem at this
time. There are now a total of seven bills before the House. These
bills fall into three categories which present the possible solutions:
(1) exempt all professional team sports from the anti-trust laws ;33
(2) place baseball under the act ;34 or (3) place the four major team
sports under the act, but specifically exempt from anti-trust enforcement
certain practices considered essential to the successful operation of these
30348 U.S. 222 (1955).
"Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147
F. Supp. 154 (1956).
"2 352 U.S. at 452.
"H.R. 5383, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
H.R. 5307, 5319, 85th Cdng., 1st Sess. (1957).
1958]
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sports.35 The hearings of the subcommittee have been completed, but
as of this writing, no report has been published of its recommendations.
ROBERT G. WEBB
Constitutional Law-Limits on Power of Congressional Investigation
In Watkins v. United States1 the Supreme Court of the United
States again considered the constitutional limits on the power of con-
gressional investigation. In that case a labor union organizer was
questioned by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The Committee's authorizing resolution2 directed it to in-
vestigate "un-American propaganda activities." The witness was will-
ing to and did divulge his past political activities and the activities of
those whom he believed were still members of the communist party.
However, while disclaiming the privilege against self-incrimination, he
refused to tell whether he knew certain named persons (some of whom
were not connected with labor) to have been members of the com-
munist party, because he believed that they were not members at the
time of the investigation. He was indicted and convicted for "contempt
of Congress." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed 4 the conviction and held that it was proper for the trial court
to exclude evidence5 offered by the defendant to prove that the Com-
mittee claimed a power of exposure independent of the legislative func-
tion and was interrogating him pursuant to this claimed power. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on other grounds. 6
In the trial court and in the court of appeals the defendant argued
$ H.R. 6876, 6877, 8023, 8124, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). These four sports
are baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 STAT. 812 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
5, 15, 31, 33, 34, 40, 44 U.S.C.).
152 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).;
'233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
' The trial court excluded statements from house committee reports, house com-
mittee hearings, the Congressional Record, and newspapers to the effect that the
Committee asserted an independent power of exposure. Also excluded was evidence
offered to prove that the Committee already had in its possession the information
that it sought to acquire from defendant.
6 There were two principal reasons for reversal. First, the vagueness of the
Committee authorizing resolution inadequately safeguarded against the dissipation
of constitutional freedoms because of the impossibility of: (1) weighing congres-
sional need against private rights; (2) determining pertinency; (3) the Commit-
tee's limiting its questioning to statutory pertinency. Second, the vagueness of
the authorizing resolution denied the witness notice of the subject of the investiga-
tion with the same degree of exactness required by the due process clause in the
expression of any element of a criminal offense.
This latter reason raises a question of comparing investigating committee hear-
ings with criminal trials for purposes of the due process requirement of certainty




that the exposure motive of the committee negated a valid legislative
purpose for investigation. This theory has been argued in the lower
federal courts with conflicting results, raising the questions of whether:
(1) a congressional investigation may have exposure as its principal
goal ;7 (2) a court has authority to scrutinize congressional or committee
motives ;8 (3) a legitimate purpose is conclusively presumed when the
subject of the investigation is one concerning which Congress may
validly legislate ;9 (4) the validity of the legislative purpose can be de-
termined by committee motives;1° (5) a committee investigation is in-
validated by an improper committee purpose. 1
The Watkins case only partially answered these questions. In com-
menting on the exclusion of the evidence, the Court indicated that
although there is no power in Congress to expose for exposure's sake,
the purpose of Congress is not to be tested by examining committee
motives. The Court then asserted that committee "motives alone would
not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by a House of
Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served."'1 2 The
statement by its terms applies only when the legislative purpose is
served. Thus it sheds little light on the problem of determining whether
the Supreme Court will recognize improper committee motivation as
being so gross that the legislative purpose is not being served. The his-
torical development of limitations on the power of investigation may
illuminate this problem.
More than three quarters of a century ago in Kilbourn v. Thomp-
so 1' 3 the Court pointed out that Congress does not "possess the general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen."'14 Thus
if a witness is to be compelled to answer there must be a valid legisla-
I1n United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947), the court re-
fused to decide "whether a congressional investigation may have exposure as its
principal goal."
'In Eisler v. United States, 179 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed per
curiam, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), the court .ruled that it had no authority to scrutinize
congressional or committee motives.
'In Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the court ruled
that a legitimate purpose is presumed when the subject of investigation is one
concerning which Congress can validly legislate. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States,
240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 354 U.S. 930 (1957), where the
court ruled that evidence of a committee exposure motive, which does not negate
other legitimate purposes of inquiry, does not rebut the presumption that con-
gressional investigations have valid legislative purposes.
"0In United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the Com-
mittee called a witness for an improper purpose and the court held that the Com-
mittee was not pursuing a valid legislative purpose and directed a verdict of
acquittal.
" See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
'72Id. at 200.
18103 U.S. 168 (1880).
1"Id. at 190.
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tive purpose,15 and questions asked must be pertinent to the matter un-
der inquiry.16 When the investigation is by committee, the pertinency
of questions is "determined by reference to the scope of the authority
vested in the committee"'17 by its authorizing resolution. Also, the con-
gressional need for the information sought must be weighed against
rights secured to the witness by the first amendment.'
8
It seems logical that there would be no congressional need for an
investigation if the principal goal of the committee were public exposure
of the individual's political beliefs or past associations. Since Congress
has no power to expose for exposure's sake, this should be true because
Congress ought not to be able legally to conduct an investigation by
committee which it could not legally conduct itself. Congress could
have no legitimate need for information which it could not legally
acquire. By this view, Watkins might have been decided on the
ground that the evidence of improper committee motivation should have
been admitted in order to give the defendant an opportunity to prove
that he was convicted pursuant to an invalid investigation.
GASTON H. GAGE
Criminal Law-Offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating
Liquor When Vehicle Is Motionless
In 1955, 1,165 persons met death by accident on North Carolina
highways.' This placed North Carolina eighth in the nation in total
highway accident deaths, and eleventh in deaths per vehicle-miles
traveled 2-- figures which are representative of North Carolina's accident
rate for recent years.3 Of these 1,165 accidental deaths, approximately
ten per cent may be attributed to the effects of alcohol.4 These simple
figures indicate the gravity of North Carolina's highway "alcohol-
accident" problem and the pressing need for some effective corrective
action. It will be the purpose of this Note to consider one area of the
" Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Barry v. United States ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1928); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1926) ; In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1896).
10 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1926).
'7 Sinclair v. United, States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) ; Barry v. United States
ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1928) (dictum).
"8 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918).
NEW YoRK HERALn TRIBUNE, THE Woaw ALMANaC 367 (1957).
Ibid.
8 Id., 1945-55.
'The ingestion of enough alcohol to give a blood content of between 0.10 and
0.15 per cent alcohol (which is for most people five or six cocktails) multiplies
the chances of a person's having an accident by three. If the blood content of
alcohol goes above 0.15 per cent, a person's chances of having an accident are
multiplied by ten. Traffic Review & Digest, Aug. 1954, p. 2.
[Vol. 36
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law where some such corrective action might appropriately be taken.
A situation which involves great potential danger to the highway
public and which has given the courts of other states considerable
difficulty is this: The defendant is found alone in the front seat of an
automobile, obviously intoxicated. The car is stopped on a public
thoroughfare at night; the lights are on, but the engine is dead. There
is no evidence as to how the car got there, or how long it or the
defendant has been there. The controlling statute makes it unlawful
to operate or drive an automobile while under the influence of alcohol.5
The question is, should the defendant be convicted on these facts of
driving or operating a car while intoxicated? Do the foregoing facts
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated
his car while intoxicated?
There have been four cases decided where the facts were essentially
those given above,6 and the result is an even split as to what con-
clusions should be drawn from the facts.
Supporting the view that a set of facts such as outlined above is
sufficient to go to the jury, and therefore sufficient to support a con-
viction of drunken driving, is State v. Bauwngartner.7  There, the de-
fendant was found at about midnight in his truck, stopped in the proper
traffic lane on a main street. His lights and ignition were on, but the
engine was off. The defendant was slumped over the wheel, uncon-
scious. On appeal from a conviction of drunken driving, the defendant
contended there was no evidence that he had driven the truck while
drunk. The court rejected the argument, stating:
It is true that no one actually saw defendant driving his truck,
but the evidence amply supports the conclusion that he actually
did so. From the undisputed facts in the case the inference is
inescapable that defendant operated his truck while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor.8
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953) provides as follows: "It shall be unlawful
and punishable... for any person . . . who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or narcotic drugs, to drive any vehicle upon the highways within this
State."
0 State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 29 A.2d 582 (1942) ; State v. Hazen, 176
Kan. 594, 272 P.2d 1117 (1952); State v. Baumgartner, 21 N.J. Super. 348,
91 A.2d 222 (App. Div. 1952); State v. Hall, 271 Wis. 450, 73 N.W.2d 585
(1955). For cases involving the question of what constitutes "driving" or "opera-
tion," see 5A Am. JuR., Automobiles & Highway Trafic §§ 1161, 1162 (1956); 61'
C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 628, 633 (1949). For cases discussing "intoxication,"
see 5A Am. JuR., Automobiles & Highway Trafic § 1159 (1956); 61 C.J.S.,
Motor Vehicles §§ 625, 627 (1949). For cases on attempts to drive, see 5A Am.
JuR., Automobiles & Highway Traic § 1167 (1956); 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles
§ 630 (1949). For a comprehensive discussion of the various aspects of the
subject, see Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 570 (1956).
State v. Baumgartner, supra note 6.8 Id. at -, 91 A.2d at 223.
1958]
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In accord with the foregoing case is State v. Hazen,9 where the court
said,
For all the record shows, the jury reached the obvious con-
clusion that the defendant drove the vehicle to the place where
it was found, and that at the time was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, on the theory that a sober person would not
park his car in the middle of the highway with the lights off,
after dark . . . . [T]he circumstantial evidence above related
was sufficient to withstand the demurrer and to support the ver-
dict of guilty.10
In contrast to these cases is State v. Hall."' Again the facts were
those of the hypothetical, 12 but on appeal from a conviction this court
stated:
[T]here is no evidence that he had operated his automobile
while intoxicated. He was not seen driving the car; the car was
not seen in motion prior to the time the officers found it; no one
knew how long it had been there; the defendant was seated on
the passenger side. . . . The inferences that may be drawn from
the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as
with guilt.'
8
In State v. McDonough,14 the court reversed a conviction with this
language:
Our law is settled that the proof of guilt must exclude, not
every possible, but every reasonable supposition of the innocence
of the accused .... We conclude that the evidence in the instant
case does not exclude every reasonable supposition of the inno-
cence of the defendant.
. .. A rational and reasonable conclusion would be that
another person had driven the car and had gone to secure as-
sistance in extricating the wheel from the wire.15
176 Kan. 594, 272 P.2d 1117 (1954). The defendant in this case was found on
a rural road instead of in the city, and his lights were off instead of on.
1O Id. at 595, 272 P.2d at 1118.
1271 Wis. 450, 73 N.W.2d 585 (1955).
" In this case, the car was stopped at night with the lights burning and the
engine running. The right front door was open, and it appeared that the defendant
had gotten out to answer a call of nature. When found, he was in the passenger's
seat.
18 State v. Hall, 271 Wis. 450, 452, 73 N.W.2d 585, 586 (1955).
"129 Conn. 483, 29 A.2d 582 (1942). This case differs from the preceding
cases in that the car was in a ditch on the right-hand side of the road with a
wheel over a wire of a fence.5 Id. at 485, 29 A.2d at 583. For cases involving slight variations on the
facts of the principal cases given above and which uphold a conviction, see: State
v. Elliott, 13 N.J. Super. 432, 80 A.2d 473 (App. Div. 1951) (Defendant was seen
drunk, and a short time thereafter his car was seen being driven into his back-
yard with only one occupant. Shortly after this the defendant was found slumped
over its steering wheel; held, logical conclusion that the defendant was driving
under the influence of alcohol.); Hughes v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 300, 276 S.W.2d
[Vol. 36
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Drunken driving in North Carolina is prohibited by G.S. § 20-138,16
which defines three distinct elements of the offense: (1) driving a
vehicle, (2) on the highway,17 (3) while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor.' 8 In the situation hereinbefore presented, the latter
two elements would not be in issue. As to the first, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that "driving" imports motion,19 and, there-
fore, sitting at the wheel of a standing car would not, as such, violate
the statute.
No North Carolina case has been found which has presented the
hypothetical fact situation under consideration, but in a case bearing
some analogy to the present situation,20 the state's evidence showed that
the defendant's truck ran into A's car, and that the defendant was "in
the truck going off."'2 1 A got a policeman and they found the defendant
alone in his truck a short time later about six-tenths of a mile from the
scene of the accident. On the defendant's motion for nonsuit, the court
held the evidence sufficient to support a conviction of operating a vehicle
while under the influence. This case differs from the principal cases
discussed herein in that there was some direct evidence that the de-
813 (1955) (Witness saw car being driven erratically; only one person in it. Car
stopped, witness went on for eleven miles and informed patrolman who found
defendant as reported. Conviction upheld.).
For similar cases refusing to uphold a conviction, see People v. Kelly, 27 Cal.
App. 753, 70 P.2d 276 (App. Dep't 1937) (Two cars collided; when witness
appeared defendant and a young woman were standing at the scene. Appellate
court reversed a conviction; driver could have been either party.) ; Kelley v.
State, 294 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. 1956) (Witness wakened by sound of crash
outside home; dressed and went to scene immediately. Found defendant in car
alone, with the left front door open. Conviction reversed on appeal; state did not
disprove hypothesis that car could have been driven by another.) ; Spinks v. State,
156 Tex. Crim. 418, 243 S.W.2d 173 (1951) (Witness heard crash and went to
investigate. Found defendant climbing out left side of front seat. Conviction
reversed for insufficient evidence.). For an extreme case upholding conviction, see
Lytle v. State, 299 P.2d 175 (Okla. 1956) (Witness saw a car ahead of him speed-
ing and apparently trying to hit another car. Witness took license number, and
saw car parked; there was only one occupant. He then notified policeman, who
found car as reported. Policeman then went into nearby pool hall where he found
defendant, owner of car, who had the keys to the car. Policeman had seen de-
fendant drive car "previously," but defendant was not identified by witness. A
conviction of drunken drivinq was upheld.).a N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953).
17 For a discussion of this element of the offense, see State v. Perry. 230 N.C.
361, 53 S.E.2d 288 (1949).
18 For a discussion of the tests of intoxication in North Carolina, see State
v. Willard, 241 N.C. 259, 84 S.E.2d 899 (1954). For a discussion of the sufficiency
and admissibility of the evidence of intoxication, see State v. Willard, supra;
State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d 763 (1952) ; State v. Newton. 207 N.C.
323, 177 S.E. 184 (1934). For a definition of "under the influence," see State v.
Lee, 237 N.C. 263, 74 S.E.2d 654 (1953) ; State v. Biggerstaff, 226 N.C. 603, 39
S.E.2d 619 (1946) ; State v. Carroll.-*226 N.C. 237, 37 S.E.2d 688 (1946).
1" State v. Hatcher, 210 N.C. 55, 185 S.E. 435 (1936).
'0 State v. Nail, 239 N.C. 60, 79 S.E.2d 354 (1953).
a- Id. at 61, 79 S.E2d at 355. The reported evidence did not make this point
entirely clear.
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fendant who was found in the truck had been "in the truck going off"
only a short time previously.
22
The traditional rule governing the sufficiency of circumstantial evi-
dence to go to the jury in North Carolina is stated in the leading case of
State v. Matthews:23 "[T]he true rule is that the circumstances and
evidence must be such as to produce a moral certainty of guilt and
to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis."24 The differing functions
of the court and the jury were explained in State v. Prince :25 "The
sufficiency of proof in law is for the court-the moral weight of legally
sufficient proof is for the jury."26  Applying the North Carolina rule
as stated in the preceding cases to the hypothetical situation earlier
stated, there is at least some doubt that the North Carolina Supreme
Court would allow such a case to go to the jury under the existing
statute.
27
Ten states28 now have statutes making it unlawful to drive or to be
in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated,29 and both
Canada and England have long had such statutes.30 Only four cases
have been found involving the construction of state statutes prohibiting
control of a vehicle while intoxicated.31 In State v. Webb,3 2 after first
deciding that the Arizona statute33 defined a new crime, the court re-
marked,
It appears to us to be even more important for the legislature
to prevent operators of cars who are under the influence of in-
toxicating liquors... from entering upon the highways and into
the stream of traffic than to permit them to enter thereon and
after a tragic accident has happened to punish them for maiming
22 Cf. State v. Newton, 207 N.C. 323, 177 S.E. 184 (1934).
22 66 N.C. 106 (1872).
2'Id. at 115.
2- 182 N.C. 788, 108 S.E. 330 (1921).
2" Id. at 791, 108 S.E. at 331. For a collection of cases on the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to go to the jury, see State v. Smith, 236 N.C. 748, 73
S.E.2d 901 (1952).
27 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953).
23 Ariz., Ark., Fla., Idaho, Mont., Neb., N.M., Tenn., Utah, and Wash.
20A typical statute is that of Arizona, which provides in pertinent parts: "It is
unlawful and punishable . . . for any person who is under the influence of intox-
icating liquor to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this
state." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (1956).
"0 CAN. Ray. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) ; Road Traffic Act, 1930, 20 & 21
GEo. 5, c. 43, § 15.
", State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954) ; Uldrich v. State, 162 Neb.
746, 77 N.W.2d 305 (1956) ; State v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio Op. 443 (C.P. 1945) ; State
v. Mason, 89 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1955). West Virginia and Ohio have since
amended their statutes eliminating the "control" provisions. OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.19 (Page 1954) ; W. VA. Coos ANN. § 1721(331) (1955).
State v. Webb, supra note 31.
" ARiz. RFV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (1956).
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or causing the death of those who are lawfully in the use of such
highways.
3 4
Two of the other decisions 35 are of similar import; the third, however,
holds that a statute similar to that of Arizona defined but one crime,36
viz., drunken driving.
The English and Canadian cases seem now to be wholly agreed that
statutes imposing criminal liability for being in the "actual physical
control" of a vehicle while intoxicated defined a new crime.37 Prior
to the statutory amendment in 1947,38 there was disagreement among
the Canadian cases on whether mens rea was an essential element of the
crime, 3 9 but the amendment seems to have effectively established that
being in control of a vehicle while intoxicated ipso facto constitutes the
crime.40  Furthermore, it places the burden on an intoxicated person
found in the driver's seat to prove that he was not in control.
41
The English courts have gone even further in their decisions on this
question. In a case decided in 1952,42 the defendant had come out of a
pub, and was walking toward a van parked nearby. He was observed
by an officer, who inquired if the defendant was going to drive the van
home. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, the officer arrested the
defendant for being in charge of a vehicle while intoxicated. The case
was dismissed below, but on appeal, the court said, in abrupt language
clearly indicative of its feelings on the matter, "I cannot understand the
difficulty which the justices of Middlesex . . . found in this case."
43
Whereupon it reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for trial.44
In view of the gravity of the "alcohol-accident" problem in North
Carolina, and the probability that the North Carolina court would not
" State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 11, 274 P.2d 338, 339 (1954), quoting from State
v. Harold, 74 Ariz. 210, 215, 246 P.2d 178, 181 (1952).
"' State v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio Op. 443 (C.P. 1945) ; State v. Mason, 89 S.E.2d
425 (W. Va. 1955).
" Uldrich v. State, 162 Neb. 746, 77 N.W.2d 305 (1956).
" Rex v. Crowe, [1941] 76 Can. Crim. R. 170, 4 D.L.R. 82; Jowett-Shooter
v. Franklin, [1949] 2 All E.R. 730 (K.B.).
"Criminal Code, 1947, 11 GEO. 6, c. 55, § 10 (Canada).
"See Rex v. Crowe, [1941] 76 Can. Crim. R_ 170, 4 D.L.R. 82; Rex v.
Thomson, [1941] 75 Can. Crim. R. 141, 1 D.L.R. 516." Rex v. Johnston, [1950] 97 Can. Crim. R. 345, 3 D.L.R. 48.
1 The present Canadian statute reads, in part, as follows: "[W]here a person
occupies the seat ordinarily occupied by the driver of a motor vehicle or automobile
he shall be deemed to have the care or control of the vehicle unless he establishes
that he did not enter or mount the vehicle for the purpose of setting it in motion."
CAN. REv. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) (later amended, Criminal Code, 1954, 2-3
ELIZ. 2, c. 51, §§ 222-24 (Canada)).
"Leach v. Evans, [1952] 2 All E.R. 264 (Q.B.).
,3 Ibid.
"Ibid. An interesting development of the English law was the extension of the
provisions of their comparable law to include the operation of bicycles. Road
Traffic Act, 1930, 20 & 21 GEo. 5, c. 43, § 15 (later amended, 4 & 5 ELIZ. 2, c.
67, § 11 (1956)).
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sustain a conviction in the hypothetical hereinbefore presented, it is
suggested that a statute such as that in force in Canada45 is desirable.
Under the Canadian statute, the elements of the offense are two:
(1) impairment of the defendant's ability to drive a motor vehicle by
alcohol; and (2) having the care or control of a motor vehicle during
such impairment. Such a statute properly relieves the courts of the
burden of trying to reconcile the need for full proof of guilt of the
accused with the conflicting need for protection of the public on the
highways. It properly raises a presumption against one who is found in
such circumstances, yet it does not foreclose a showing by the defendant
that he was not actually in control 6 of the vehicle, and was not, there-
fore, creating the danger which is to be obviated.
LUxE R. CORBETT
Criminal Procedure-Arrest Without a Warrant-Informer's Tip as
Constituting Reasonable Grounds
In Draper v. United States' a federal narcotics agent was notified by
a hired informer that defendant was peddling dope to several addicts
in the Denver area. Four days later the informer revealed that de-
fendant would go to Chicago to get heroin on a certain day and that
he would return on a morning train on either of two given days. The
informer's tips had always been reliable in the past. The agent had
never heard of defendant before and it was not shown whether or not
he had a criminal record. A complete description of physical char-
acteristics, clothing, and manner of walking was given. On the morn-
ing of the second day the agent saw a man leaving the Chicago train
who matched the description given by the informer. Defendant was
approached and seized by the agent. When he gave a name which did
not correspond with the tip his wallet was taken and his true identity
learned. He was placed under arrest and a search of his person re-
vealed two ounces of heroin and a syringe. The agent had no warrant.
Before tria2 defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment3
because made incident to an unlawful arrest. Thus the sole issue on the
"CAN. REv. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) (later amended, Criminal Code,
1954, 2-3 ELiz. 2, c. 51, §§ 222-24 (Canada)).
"Rex v. Johnston, [1950] 97 Can. Crim. R. 345, 3 D.L.R. 48 (dictum). Cf.
Jowett-Shooter v. Franklin, [1949] 2 All E.R. 730 (K.B.) (Defendant who got
into a car, but not under the steering wheel, and not intending to drive, found to
be in charge of vehicle, but driving permit not suspended because no intent to
drive).
'248 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1957).
2United States v. Draper, 146 F. Supp. 689 (D. Colo. 1956).
'U.S. CoTsT. amend. IV.
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
defendant's motion was the lawfulness of the arrest. The motion was
denied and defendant was tried and convicted. The court of appeals,
in affirming, found the arrest valid because "the information furnished,
together with the verification thereof after appellant alighted from the
train, was sufficient to give the agent reasonable grounds to believe that
appellant was committing a violation of the Narcotics Act."4
A strong dissenting opinion argued that the arrest was unlawful
because, inter alia, hearsay information alone, with no other indication
of guilt within the officer's knowledge, is not a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt.5 This contention presents a problem which has not
infrequently been before the federal courts, viz., the weight to be given
an informer's tip in determining whether an officer arresting without a
warrant had "reasonable grounds."
6
To be given any effect at all the information must come from one
who is reliable. An uncorroborated tip by an informer whose identity
248 F.2d at 299.
Judge Huxman, writing the dissent, also stated that the arrest was unlawful
because the exigencies of the situation did not call for arrest without a warrant.
Such a requirement is not generally said to be a prerequisite for a valid arrest.
The common law rule is that "where an officer, in good faith, believes that a
person is guilty of a felony, and -his belief rests on such grounds as would induce
an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the circumstances, to believe like-
wise, he has such probable cause for his belief as will justify him in arresting
without a warrant" 6 C.J.S., Arrest § 6, at 596 (1937). No case has been found
where it was held that the fourth amendment required any more where the issue
was the validity of an arrest. Some jurisdictions have, by statute, added the
requirement that there be a danger that the suspected felon will escape if not
arrested. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (Supp. 1957). Federal narcotics
agents are not common law peace officers, but the statute under which the agent
in the principal case acted authorizes arrest without a warrant where the agent
has "reasonable grounds" to believe that the person to be arrested has violated
the narcotics laws. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 70 STAT. 567, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7607(2) (Supp. 1957). This in effect gives narcotics agents the same power
that common law peace officers have to arrest without a warrant. The two cases
on which Judge Huxman relied on this point, McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948), and United States v. Vleck, 17 F. Supp. 110 (D. Neb. 1936),
dealt with searches of dwellings without warrants and the federal courts have been
consistently critical of invasion and search of houses without a warrant in the
absence of exceptional circumstances requiring immediate action. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32
(1925), the Court said: "[I]t has always been assumed that one's house cannot
lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful
arrest therein." See also Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir.
1948).
The question is usually presented by the defendant's pre-trial motion to sup-
press evidence seized incident to the allegedly unlawful arrest. At least two cases
have rejected such information altogether on the ground that the arresting officer
must be possessed of facts that would be competent evidence in a jury trial and not
mere hearsay information. Gran v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) ; Worth-
ington v. United States, supra note 5. But this view, as pointed out by the district
judge in the principal case, was disapproved in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949), on the ground that the issue on defendant's motion was not his
guilt or innocence but was rather the reasonableness of the officer's belief in
guilt at the time of the arrest.
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and reliability are unknown is not considered.7 In United States v.
Blich8 the arrest was invalidated because the source of the information
was not given so that the court could pass on its reliability, while in
Ard v. United States9 the implication is that it was sufficient that the
officer considered the source reliable.
In a few cases there is dicta to the effect that reliable information
alone would be sufficient grounds on which to base an arrest without a
warrant. 10 But the general rule is that such information, unless sup-
plemented by further facts, is insufficient." In a majority of the cases
where arrests prompted by tips were upheld, the "further facts" were
things observed by the officers which of themselves tended to indicate
guilt independent of the informer's tip.12 In several cases the only
supplementary information the officers had was a knowledge of prior
criminal activity and the arrests were held lawful. 13 Two district court
cases stand in opposition to the two last-mentioned views, however.
In United States v. Clark14 the officers knew that a grocery store was
illegally selling narcotics, saw defendant enter the store with the in-
former, and by pre-arranged signal were tipped off by the informer that
defendant had narcotics in her possession when she came out. The
arrest was held unlawful because there was no showing (to the officers)
that "the informer's information was itself more than mere guess-work
7 Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
145 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
'54 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 550 (1932). See also
Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
839 (1947).
10 Cannon v. United States, snpra note 9, at 954; United States v. Heitner, 149
F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 727 (1945) ; Somer v. United
States, 138 F.2d 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1943).
"' United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1951) (dictum) ; United
States v. Sebo, 101 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1939) (dictum) ; Wisniewski v. United
States, 47 F.2d 825, 826 (6th Cir. 1931) (dictum) ; United States v. Turner, 126
F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Md. 1954) (dictum); MACHEN, SARCH AND SEIZURE 51,
52 (1950).
12 Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (two passengers fled when
officers stopped defendant's car) ; United States v. Bianco, supra note 11 (de-
fendant carried abnormally large suitcase for one day trip and was seen with two
known offenders); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945)
(defendant dropped a bottle of opium wine on being approached by the officer) ;
United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
727 (1945) (defendants drove away rapidly after seeing the officers) ; Stobble v.
United States, 91 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1937) (defendant seen carrying two small
envelopes of the usual size and color in which heroin is contained); Coupe v.
United States, 113 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940)
(officers saw what looked like "numbers" pads through the window of defendant's
car) ; Wisniewski v. United States, supra note 11 (officers saw defendant get a
jug and burlap bag out of a known bootlegger's car and put them in his own car).
""United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957); Ard v. United
States, 54 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 550 (1932); United
States v. Turner, 126 F. Supp. 349 (D. Md. 1954).
1429 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
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und speculation." 15 In United States v. Baldocci'6 narcotics agents
were informed that defendant, a known previous offender, was throwing
dope over a prison's walls to inmates at night. The agents hid by tbh
wall and arrested defendant when he drove up in a car. The arrest wa-
invalidated because made "merely upon suspicion."
In the principal case there were no "further facts" within the agent's
knowledge. Nothing the defendant did independently aroused suspicion
and the agent had no knowledge of any past criminal activity. "Reason-
able grounds" consisted of the tip plus the fact that defendant's appear-
ance and movements conformed with the information given. At least
four cases would seem to be in accord. In Brady v. United States'
7
the defendants' vehicles were stopped and arrests made after the move-
ments and makes of the vehicles had been checked against the informa-
tion supplied. In King v. United States 8 the movements of defendant's
auto were consistent with the tip. In White v. United States19 de-
fendant was arrested as he walked up to a house where addicts were
said to be awaiting his arrival with a quantity of narcotics. In United
States v. Hill2" the court paid lip service to the rule laid down in the
Clark case, viz., that information from third persons, no matter how
reliable, must be shown to be more than mere speculation, but then pro-
ceeded to hold that personal verification by the officers of defendants'
movements as described by the informer was sufficient. The quantum
of guilt-indication required by these cases was described in the Hill
case when the court said that reliable information alone was not
sufficient but that reasonable grounds existed when "the information
received . . . was verified, insofar as it could be, by personal observa-
tion and found to be accurate in its particulars. '" 2 1  The facts of these
cases show that the verification does not have to extend to conduct
which would tend of itself to indicate guilt of the crime.
While this line of cases, including the principal case, constitutes a
liberal departure from the reliable information plus further facts rule,
the decisions are considered sound.
22
ROBERT W. KING, JR.
"5 Id. at 140. The fact that the search turns up evidence of guilt has no bearing
on the question of whether the arresting officer had "reasonable grounds" at the
time of the arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
1842 F.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
300 Fed. 540 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 620 (1924).181 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1924).
10 16 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927).
114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).21Id. at 442.
22 It would appear that the views best illustrated by the following quotation
have some support.
"As we look at some of the uses which the criminal classes have made of
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Fair Labor Standards Act-Belo Contracts-Hours Guaranteed and
Actually Worked
In the 1956 case of Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &
Ins. Co.' defendant was engaged in the casualty insurance business,
primarily the insuring of steam boilers, pressure vessels, and machinery.
The company employed some six hundred inspectors throughout the
United States. Their duties necessitated irregular hours of work,
usually fluctuating between thirty-five and fifty hours per week. The
company paid the inspectors under individual guaranteed wage con-
tracts which provided for an hourly rate of pay in excess of the statu-
tory minimum for the first forty hours in each workweek, time and
one-half for each hour over forty, and a weekly guarantee of an amount
equivalent to the sum payable if sixty hours were actually worked. It
was not contemplated that any inspector would have to work more than
sixty hours in any one workweek, and each inspector was required to
get special permission before doing so. Actually, only one-fourth of one
percent of the workweeks over a two-year period exceeded sixty hours.
The Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin the alleged violations of the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 He maintained
that the guaranteed wage contract was invalid because the hours worked
did not exceed the hours guaranteed in a substantial number of work-
weeks. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
contract was valid under section 7(e) 3 of the FLSA.
The FLSA specifies in section 7(a) that an employee covered by
the act must be paid "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed" 4 for all hours worked in excess of
forty for any one workweek. Because of the multitudinous methods of
wage compensation used throughout the industries and trades covered
by the FLSA, the courts have refrained from giving "regular rate"
a rigid interpretation, but have consistently said that the rate the em-
constitutional provisions, one might suppose that the far-seeing barons who wrung
the Great Charter from King John at Runnymede were intent upon safeguarding
the twentieth century racketeer, gangster, kidnaper, gunman and corrupt political
leader in the prosecution of their sinister vocations. It ought to be possible to find
a way, by judicial interpretation, to use these constitutional provisions for the
protection of liberty without giving them such fanciful and far-fetched interpreta-
tions as to convert them into a weapon by which criminals can make war safely
upon organized society and its law-abiding members." Address by Judge Samuel
Seabury, ALI Annual Meeting, May 7, 1932.
1235 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
' Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 201-19 (1952), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 204-06, 208, 210, 213, 216 (Supp. IV,
1957), hereinafter referred to as the FLSA or the act.
8Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(e), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 207(e) (1952).
'Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(a), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 207(a) (1952).
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ployer and employee fix must be realistic and not artificial or fictitious.5
In seeking a method to stabilize wage costs and still comply with
the overtime provisions of section 7(a) of the act, some employers have
made guaranteed wage contracts with their employees. In their usual
form, these contracts provide a basic hourly rate with at least 150 per-
cent of the basic hourly rate for all hours in excess of forty. In addi-
tion, the contracts provide a fixed guaranteed salary per week, regard-
less of the number of hours worked up to a specified maximum. The
guaranteed wage is computed from the hourly rate and overtime rate
specified in the contract. No additional compensation is paid the em-
ployee unless the maximum hours are exceeded, and from that point
overtime is computed from the specified contractual rate.
The above type of contract was given a judicial test for the first time
in Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp.,6 where the employer, a newspaper
publisher, made contracts with some of his employees specifying a basic
hourly rate and time and one-half for overtime. The contract, in addi-
tion, provided the employees with a guarantee of a fixed income each
week comparable to fifty-four and one-half hours worked at the con-
tractual hourly rates. The contracts were in writing and whenever a
change was made in the guaranteed wage, a corresponding change was
made in the basic hourly rate. The United States Supreme Court, in
a five to four decision, upheld the contracts as complying with the
FLSA. The majority noted that the contracts provided sectrity and
regularity of income for employees whose work necessitated irregular
hours, and said that when such a contractual arrangement proved
mutually satisfactory to employer and employee, "[W]e should not
upset it and approve an inflexible and artificial interpretation of the
Act which finds no support in its text and which as a practical matter
eliminates the possibility of steady income to employees with irregular
hours."
7
Guaranteed wage agreements since the Belo decision have generally
been referred to as "Belo" contracts. In three cases after Belo, the
Supreme Court rejected purported "Belo" contracts.8 In each case the
5 "But this freedom of contract does not include the right to compute the
regular rate in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner so as to negate the
statutory purposes." Mitchell v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardware Co., 235 U.S.
419, 424 (1945), quoting from Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37,
42 (1944).
316 U.S. 624 (1942).7Id. at 635.
'In Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944), the employees
were paid at a "regular rate" for one-half the working day and at an "overtime
rate" for the remaining one-half of the day. An employee would thus have to work
for eighty hours before he could complete forty hours of regular time and qualify
himself for full overtime. The Court said: "Even when wages exceed the mini-
mum ... the parties to the contract must respect the statutory policy of requiring
the employer to pay one and one-half times the regular hourly rate for all hours
19581
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Court said that it was not overruling the Belo decision, but the effect
seemed to be that Belo was restricted to its particular facts. In 1947
the Administrator made an unsuccessful attempt to have the Belo decision
overruled in the case of Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.0
In that case, an oil well cementing company had Belo-type contracts
with its employees. The employees were paid a guaranteed wage which
would not be exceeded unless they worked eighty-four hours a week,
but it was shown that in twenty percent of the weeks worked, the
eighty-four hour week was in fact exceeded. The Court again found
a reasonable relationship between the hourly rate and the overtime paid,
and rejected the Administrator's contention that the regular rate should
be the quotient of the amount of the guarantee, divided by the number
of hours actually worked in each workweek. Thus, Belo was again
sustained.' 0
Although disappointed by the Court in his attempt to determine the
"regular rate" by taking the total guarantee and dividing it by the hours
worked in any given week and computing overtime with this rate as
the base, the Administrator sought a narrow construction of the Belo and
Halliburton cases. He felt justified in advocating as the test for the
validity of Belo contracts a rule which would require that the hours
guaranteed must be exceeded in a "substantial number of workweeks."
He reasoned that only if the guaranteed hours are exceeded could the
regular rate be put into actual operation. In both the Belo and Halli-
burton cases, the employees worked more than the number of hours
guaranteed in some weeks. Whether or not these cases provided
grounds for such a test is arguable, but the Administrator successfully
actually worked in excess of 40." Id. at 42. In Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds
Hardware Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945), the Court rejected a contract which provided
for an hourly rate of thirty-five cents with time and one-half for hours worked
over forty, but with a guarantee based on a piece rate of eighty cents per 1000
feet of lumber stacked and seventy cents per 1000 feet of lumber ricked. The
evidence showed the guarantee would in practical effect greatly exceed the stipu-
lated hourly rate. The Court said: "The [Belo] case is no authority however, for
the proposition that the regular rate may be fixed by contract at a point completely
unrelated to the payments actually and normally received each week by the em-
ployees." Id. at 426. In Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945),
a collective bargaining contract with an electrical equipment manufacturer pro-
vided both an hourly rate and job prices. If the job prices exceeded the hourly
rate, which the evidence showed they did 98.5% of the time, the employees were
paid at the job price. Overtime, however, was computed on the basis of the
stipulated hourly rate. The Court held that the bonus derived from the job prices
must be included in determining the regular rate on which overtime was computed.331 U.S. 17 (1947).
1' Ibid. It is interesting to note the language of the Court with reference
to the Belo decision. "Even if we doubted the wisdom of the Belo decision as an




invoked it in cases in two different courts of appeals;11 however, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a Belo contract where the employees never ex-
ceeded the hours guaranteed, 12 and the Second Circuit upheld such a
contract without reference to the number of workweeks in which the
hours guaranteed were exceeded.
13
The FLSA was extensively amended in 1949,14 and among the
amendments modifying the strict application of section 7(a) was the
provision now found in section 7(e) of the act.15 In substance, this
provision lays down the tests which Congress has established for the
legality of a particular Belo contract. Four separate tests are included,
and all of them must be met if a guaranteed wage contract is to be valid.
First, the duties of the employee must necessitate irregular hours;
second, the arrangement must be based on a bona fide contract; third,
the contract must provide a regular rate not less than the minimum
wage, and at least one and one-half times this rate for all hours over
forty a week; and fourth, the guarantee must cover not more than sixty
hours at the rate specified.
Following the enactment of section 7(e), the Administrator con-
tinued to apply the "substantial number of workweeks" test. His
position was that by use of the phrase "regular rate," this section in-
corporated by implication the "substantial number of workweeks" re-
quirement which had been applied to some "Belo" contracts by judicial
interpretation prior to the 1949 amendments. 16
McComb v. Sterling Ice & Cold Storage Co., 165 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1947);
McComb v. Roig, 181 F.2d 726 (lst Cir. 1950). In the latter case, the court
stated: "It is possible, of course, that the relation between the hourly rate and
the guaranty might be set by the employer with reference... to what the employer
supposes would be the maximum possible workweek. In such a case . . . the
workers would never exceed their guarantees, the purported hourly rate would
never control the amount of the wdekly pay and would pretty surely be found
to be fictitious." Id. at 729-30.
12 McComb v. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers Ass'n, 175 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1949).
"1McComb v. Utica Knitting Co., 164 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1947).
1" Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, 63 STAT. 910 (1949), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-08, 211-17 (1952), amending 52 STAT. 1060 (1938).
1Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(e), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 207(e) (1952), which provides: "No employer shall be deemed to have
violated subsection [7] (a) by employing any employee for a workweek in excess
of forty hours if such employee is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual
contract . .. if the duties of such employee necessitate irregular hours of work,
and the contract or agreement (1) specifies a regular rate of pay not less than
the minimum hourly rate provided in section 206(a) of this title and compensation
at not less than one and one-half times such rate for all hours worked in excess
of forty in any workweek, and (2) provides a weekly guarantee of pay for not
more than sixty hours based on the rates so specified."
1" "In order for a contract to qualify as a bona fide contract ... the number of
hours for which pay is guaranteed must bear a reasonable relation to the number
of hours the employee may be expected to work. A guarantee of pay for 60 hours
to an employee whose duties necessitate irregular hours of work which can reason-
ably be expected to range no higher than 50 hours would not qualify as a bona
fide contract under this section. The rate specified in such a contract would be
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The courts of appeals have consistently rejected the Administrator's
test in all cases which have been decided since the 1949 amendments to
the FLSA. In Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co.1 7 an action was
brought to enjoin the company from violating overtime and record keep-
ing provisions of the act. The case involved employees (meat processors)
of the company who were paid a guaranteed wage based on a fifty hour
week. Although none of the employees ever worked in excess of fifty
hours, the contract was held to be valid. After stating that the FLSA
imposed no inflexible form of contract, the court ruled that the test in
each case is whether the wage rate (for non-overtime work) is "fictitious"
or whether it is in fact the actual rate paid. The "substantial number of
workweeks" test is not mentioned, and section 7(e) is not relied upon
to justify the decision. The court said: "Contracts in which, as in the
present case, the guaranteed compensation is actually predicated upon
and computed by the stipulated wage rate meet all requirements of the
Act. This was true before as it is after the amendment of the Act in
1949 to recognize the validity of such contracts.
18
In Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Khtge, Inc.'0 the First Circuit sum-
marized the judicial history of Belo contracts prior to the 1949 amend-
ments, and said that the passage of section 7(e) means that courts are
no longer "groping in the dark . . . without statutory guidance ...
but rather that "the new § 7(e) enables the courts to make a fresh
start .... ,,21 The court distinguished the case of McComb v. Roig,22
which it had decided in 1950 under the pre-1949 act, where the contract
was held invalid because, among other reasons, it did not comply
with the "substantial number of workweeks" test. The court said that
reading a substantial number of workweeks test into section 7(e) as the
Administrator proposed would be unwarranted judicial legislation.
Mitchell v. Adams,28 pending appeal at the time of the Brandtien
wholly fictitious and therefore would not be a 'regular rate' .... " 29 C.F.R.
§ 778.18(f) (1956). See also 29 C.F.R. § 778.18(g) (1956).
"' 202 F.2d 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
18 Id. at 238.
"9228 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 940 (1956). Here,
erectors of printing presses were working under a guarantee of a forty-eight hour
week. They exceeded the hours guaranteed in about 3% of the workweeks. The
court upheld the contracts and specifically rejected the contention that although
the contract otherwise qualified, it was still invalid since the employees did not
exceed the hours guaranteed in a "substantial" or "significant" number of work-
weeks. The Administrator's requirement that the guarantee be based on a weekly
"average" was rejected. The court said Congress has chosen not to put the "sub-
stantial number of workweeks" test in the Belo contract section of the act.
Rejecting the Administrator's contention that the workweeks must be averaged,
the court stated that Congress had only restricted the contracts to guarantees of
pay for "not more than sixty hours."'I1d. at 295. Id. at 296.
" 181 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1950).
2230 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1956).
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decision, was decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1956. The result was that
still another circuit rejected the Administrator's test. In the Adams
case a shirt manufacturer made the following contract with some.of his
employees:
The Employer agrees to employ the Employee at a regular hourly
rate of pay at $1.36 per hour for the first 40 hours in any work-
week and at a rate of $2.04 per hour for all hours in excess of
40 in any workweek, with the guarantee that the employee will
receive, in any week in which he performs any work for the
Company, the sum of $95.20 as total compensation, for all work
performed up to and including 60 hours in such workweek.
2 4
In this case only one employee during one week worked in excess of
sixty hours during the five years the contracts were in operation. The
Administrator argued that in order to demonstrate good faith and show
that the regular rate of $1.36 was not fictitious it must be actually
put into operation in a "substantial number of workweeks" by having
the sixty hours exceeded. The court said: "But what was mentioned by
the Supreme Court [in the Belo case] as merely specific proof of good
faith . . . the Secretary now turns into an indispensable ingredient of
the contractual operations." 25 And also, "We think this misreads both
the Belo decisional law and the specific 1949 Amendment and is again
the search for the handy, arbitrary rule-of-thumb criteria, displacing
inquiry and deliberative judgment, leaving it all to the wisdom of the
Administrator. ' 26 The court implies that it could decide the case as
it does even without invoking the aid of section 7(e), but cites the
Brandtjen case with approval. There was no request for certiorari
from the Adams decision.
In Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., the
principal case, the Second Circuit, in rejecting the "substantial number
of workweeks" test and sustaining the contracts, summarizes the law
of Belo contracts. First, the court denies the assertion that this test
was established by pre-1949 case law. The court found nothing in either
Belo or Halliburton to substantiate such a test, and although admitting
that two courts of appeals had followed this test prior to the 1949
Amendments, 27 called attention to others which did not follow that
test.28 Second, the court states that judicial interpretation of section
7(e) has been contrary to the Administrator's position, citing the Little
Rock, Brandtjen, and Adams cases discussed above. The court rejects
2, Id. at 528.
2I d. at 530.
26 Id. at 529.
27 See note 11 supra.
" See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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the cases on which the Secretary relied29 (all of them in the district
courts) as being either distinguishable on their facts or erroneously de-
cided. Third, the court interpreted the legislative history of section
7(e) as indicating congressional unwillingness to adopt the test advo-
cated by the Secretary. The court said that Congress had all the con-
flicting views on Belo contracts presented to it in 1949 and bills were
presented which "(1) expressly outlawed guaranteed wage contracts;
(2) permitted their use, but subject to specific limitations including a
'significant number of workweeks' test; (3) permitted their use, without
limitation as to the relation between hours worked and hours guaran-
teed." °30 The court felt that "Congressional adoption of the third alter-
native... suggests ... that it did not intend their [Belo contracts] use
in the manner suggested by the Secretary."3 1 To reinforce its view, the
"' Sikes v. Williams Lumber Co., 123 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1954); Tobin
v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 143 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Tobin v. Ewbank
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 23 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 67411 (W.D. Tenn. 1952) ; Tobin
v. Wenatchee Air Service, Inc., 21 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 67019 (E.D. Wash. 1952) ;
Tobin v. Morristown Poultry Co., 21 CCH Lab. Cas. 66798 (E.D. Tenn. 1952);
Tobin v. Aronow, 96 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mont. 1951).
" 235 F.2d at 945.
"1 Ibid. Recourse to the bills introduced in both houses of Congress reveal that
H.R. 2033, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(c) (1949), and S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7(c) (1949), .would have outlawed Belo contracts. H.R. 3190, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 7(c) 1949, would not have outlawed Belo contracts, but would have made
them meet the specifications of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
In its reference to congressional rejection of a bill that permitted the use of
Belo contracts "subject to certain limitations including a 'significant number of
workweeks' test," the court was probably referring to H.R. 5856, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949), which was introduced by Congressman Lesinski on August 2, 1949.
This bill was cited by appellee in his brief before the Second Circuit at pages 9-11.
Letter from Stuart Rothman, Solicitor of Labor, to J. Halbert Conoly, February
27, 1958.
The Lesinski bill was removed from committee and debated on the floor of the
House. The Lesinski bill provided in part in section 7(c) :
"[I]n the case of an employee in an occupation in which hours of work
necessarily vary from week to week, employed in pursuance of a written con-
tract . . . which expressly provides, in conformity with regulations of the
Secretary-
"(1) a bona fide hourly rate of pay specified and actually used as the
basis on which all compensation . . . is computed;
"(2) a guarantee of compensation to the employee for each hour in
excess of forty worked by him in any workweek, in an amount not less than
one and one-half times such bona fide hourly rate; and
"(3) a specified minimum number of hours (not less than forty and
not more than sixty, and bearing a reasonable relationship to the range
of weekly hours customarily worked in such occupation during a representa-
tive period of time) for which such employee is guaranteed employment
or pay in each workweek at the rates specified in the contract;
nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to require the payment by the em-
ployer to such employee of a greater amount of overtime compensation under
this section than is provided by such written contract."
The Lesinski bill was amended by the Lucas bill, and in place of section 7(c)
above, the provision found in section 7(e) of the present law was passed by the
House. See note 15 supra.
This portion of the 1949 Amendments received very little attention on the
floor of the House. Congressman Combs, speaking on behalf of the Lesinski bill
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court applied two guides of statutory construction. First, that the
inclusion of express limitations on the use of Belo contracts in section
7(e) indicates limitations not expressed were not intended, and second,
the inclusion of a requirement in section 7(f) (3) similar to that
advocated by the Secretary in section 7(e) would support a similar in-
ference.3 2  The court in Hartford felt that the legislative history of
section 7(e) indicated that Congress rejected any "substantial number
of workweeks" test.
However, it is difficult to find any clear congressional intent on this
subject. It is doubtful whether Congress was sufficiently concerned
with this issue to either affirm or reject such a test. With the excep-
tion of limiting a Belo contract to a maximum guarantee of sixty hours,
Congress adopted the Belo case as set out by the Supreme Court. This
could indicate that the Congress in general was satisfied with the
judicial interpretations of guaranteed wage contracts. Congress may
have lacked any specific intention to incorporate by implication a "sub-
stantial number of workweeks" test into the FLSA by the use of the
term "regular rate." It would be just as doubtful that Congress in-
tended to authorize a wage contract where the hourly rate was fictitious
and unrealistic. The use of the words "regular rate" in the light of
judicial interpretation would seem to reject any such intention. The bet-
ter reasoning would be that Congress left this question to be determined
by the courts in the light of the earlier cases dealing with Belo con-
tracts.
33
and against the Lucas substitution, said, "The Lesinski bill authorizes the Secretary
to issue regulations setting forth the conditions under which such contracts
may be used, and how they have to work. The Lucas bill ...fails to define
the terms, fails to set real restraints, and fails to authorize the Secretary to issue
regulations." 95 CONG. REc. 11221 (1949). If H.R. 5856, as originally proposed
by Lesinski, is the bill referred to by the court in the Hartford case as incorporating
the "substantial number of workweeks" test, the court's conclusion is open to
the criticism that Congress merely may have refused to allow the Secretary such
broad rule-making authority. Neither H.R. 3190 nor the Lesinski version of H.R.
5856 specifically sets out the "substantial number of workweeks" test.
" The court appears to be applying its rules of construction to a situation
where they are inapplicable. In most of the 1949 amendments to § 7 of the act,
Congress was seeking to deal with problems created by specific decisions. The
amendments sought to adjust § 7 to the realities of the industrial world by per-
mitting wage plans that complied with the spirit of the act if not its technical
language. Since the purpose of § 7(a) would still apply to the exceptions such
as § 7(e), the application of a strict technical construction as in the Hartford-case
is unjustified. Furthermore, the analogy the court attempts to make between
§§ 7(e) and 7(f) (3) is unjustified since § 7(e) was aimed at employees whose
hours of employment were irregular, and § 7(f) (3) was designed for employees
whose hourly rate was subject to unusual fluctuations such as salesmen on salary
and commission.
"' Several articles and publications after the 1949 amendments indicate approval
of the "substantial number of workweeks" test. See Brewer, A "Belo" Primer
for 1950, 1 LAB. L.J. 94 (1949) ; Note, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 264 (1949) ; LIVN-
GOOD, THE FEDERAL WAGE AND HouR LAw 143 (1952).
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The Second Circuit followed its decision in Hartford when it was
confronted with Mitchell v. Feinberg,34 where a group of delivery men,
working under a collective bargaining contract, was guaranteed a forty-
eight hour week, and the hours worked did not exceed the hours
guaranteed in a substantial number of workweeks. In addition to the
guarantee, the contract provided that one-fifth of the guarantee was to
be deducted for each day the employee missed work during the five-day
week, for any reason other than lack of work. The district court had
held the contract invalid.3 5 The court of appeals in a per curiam opinion
reversed, relying on the Hartford case, and saying with regard to
the one-fifth deduction provision, "It is true that under the Feinberg
contract an employee may receive greater compensation, in terms of
hourly rates, for weeks in which he works four days (or less) than in
weeks in which he works five days. This incident, however, is not
violative of the Act and constitutes, in our judgment, insufficient ground
to differentiate the case from Hartford." The judge who wrote the
Hartford decision concurred in holding that the "substantial number of
workweeks" test was no basis for saying the contract was invalid, but
dissented from the view of the majority that Hartford was a ground
for saying a deduction from the guarantee could be validly made.30
In spite of its rejection by the courts, there is merit in the Admin-
istrator's argument. If the courts are going to approve contracts similar
to those in the Hartford case, the overtime policy of the FLSA is being
defeated. It would seem that any basic or overtime rates specified in
such contracts have no meaning and are completely fictitious. An
attorney for an employer whose employees work irregular hours but
never in excess of sixty could advise the employer to set the maximum
hours covered by the guaranteed wage contract at sixty per week. The
employer could determine a "regular rate" sufficient to guarantee a
weekly wage the employee is willing to accept. It is obvious in such a
case that the specifying of an hourly regular rate is nothing more than
creating an arbitrary figure to satisfy a technical requirement of the
FLSA. The employees will always receive the same amount of pay,
"236 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 943 (1956).
'5 Mitchell v. Feinberg, 123 F. Supp. 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
"236 F.2d at 13. "I contend that the Act requires the employer ... to pay the
guaranteed sum in compliance with § 7(e), or ... to pay his employees in accord-
ance with the 'regular rate' specified in the agreement as required by § 7(a) and
reiterated in § 7(e). I reach this conclusion reluctantly because of the obvious
benefits to employees of such a practice as the daily crediting of overtime." The
dissent relied on a pre-amendment case, 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331
U.S. 199 (1947). The idea expressed was that it should be a case of either pay
the guarantee regardless of days missed, or use the regular rate without the over-
time in workweeks of less than forty hours. The act does not permit the payment
of daily overtime, which this contract permits, and this practice would undermine
the "regular rate" language of the act.
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exactly as though they were being paid a weekly salary without regard
to an hourly rate.
The courts have consistently rejected Belo wage plans where no
hourly rate is specified or where* the fixed wage is changed without a
corresponding change in the hourly rate. Assume a plan that specified
no hourly rate, but merely guaranteed a fixed wage for sixty hours
work,37 and the employer testified at the trial of the case that neither he
nor the employees felt it necessary to specify any hourly rate since none
of the employees exceeded sixty hours of work per week. If a court
should hold such a contract invalid and yet hold the contract in Hartford
valid, it would in effect be saying that it was looking only to the tech-
nical form of the contract, and not to its substance, since in either situa-
tion the wages paid the employees would be the same. It is difficult to
believe that Congress in enacting section 7(e) intended such a result.
Although the "substantial number of workweeks" test so persistently
advocated by the Administrator has not survived judicial scrutiny,38 it
is submitted that the overtime provisions of the FLSA are being cir-
cumvented by Belo-type contracts where the hours guaranteed are not
exceeded. If the "regular rate" set in these contracts is truly bona fide,
it is difficult to perceive how employers could afford to pay such high
wages for hours not spent on the job. Perhaps this is another reason
why the Administrator looks upon these contracts with a jaundiced eye.
J. HALBERT CONOLY
JAMES F. SMITH
Marriage-Annulment-Doctrine of Relation Back
In October 1952 a widow was entitled to benefits under the Social
Security Act' as the unremarried widow of a deceased wage earner.
These benefits were terminated because of her marriage in June 1954.
In November she filed for annulment on the ground of fraud in that
the husband never intended to consummate the marriage. The husband
" See Sikes v. Williams Lumber Co., 123 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1954), where
the district court rejected a purported Belo contract which provided $75.00 for
fifty-three hours work, with no regular rate stated in the contract. The court
said that since no hourly rate was specified in the agreement, the rate alleged by
the defendant was fictitious.
"Although there have been no revisions of the Administrator's Interpretative
Bulletins published since the Hartford and Feinberg decisions, the public is
currently being advised on request that the "substantial number of workweeks"
test is no longer the sole criterion in adjudging the validity of a particular Belo-
type contract, but may be given weight in determining the bona fide nature of
the contract. Interview with Pauline W. Horton, North Carolina Federal Repre-
sentative for the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division of the United
States Department of Labor, February 13, 1958. This position has some support
in the language of the court in the Adams case. See notes 23-26 mcpra.
249 STAT. 623 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
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defaulted and the court issued a decree of annulment in December 1954.
After the decree of annulment the widow requested reinstatement of
her benefits. Her application for reinstatement was denied by the
Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance, Social Security Admin-
istration. After exhausting her administrative remedies, she com-
menced this action for review of the administrative decision. The dis-
trict court held that her benefits should be reinstated2 and the court of
appeals affirmed.3 The appellate court's decision turned on the legal
effect given to an annulment under California law and on the meaning
of the word "remarriage." In California the legal effect of an annul-
ment is that no valid marriage ever existed, even though the marriage
is only voidable. 4 The court looked to workmen's compensation casesu
and applied the meaning there given to the word remarriage, vi,., a
valid and subsisting marriage and not a void or voidable marriage.
From the standpoint of legal theory, it would appear that if a sub-
sequent marriage is void the doctrine of relation back should always
apply (in the absence of a statute) ; but, if the subsequent marriage is
only voidable, the doctrine of relation back should not apply as such
marriages are deemed valid until avoided. 6 'Nevertheless, there are
cases within the same jurisdiction holding that the doctrine does apply
and cases holding that it does not apply where the marriage is voidable. 7
Some courts make it clear that whether or not they will apply the doc-
trine will depend upon whether it effects a result which conforms to the
sanctions of sound policy and justice as between the parties, their prop-
erty rights, and the rights of their offspring.8 Other courts seem to
reach the same conclusion without expressly indicating that their de-
cision is based upon the equities of the situation rather than upon strict
legal theory.9
'Pearsall v. Folsom, 138 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
'Folsom v. Pearsall, 245 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1957).
'Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917); Goff v. Goff, 52 Cal.
App. 2d 23, 125 P.2d 848 (1942).
'Eureka Block Coal Co. v. Wells, 83 Ind. App. 181, 147 N.E. 811 (1925);
First Nat'l Bank v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 68 N.W.2d
661 (N.D. 1955); Southern Ry. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498
(1939) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 54 Ariz. 1, 91 P.2d 700 (1939)
(dictum).
6 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTic RELATIONS 9 (1931).
' Price v. Price, 24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938) (does not apply);
Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917) (does apply); Williams v.
State, 175 Misc. 972, 25 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Ct. Cl. 1941) (does not apply) ; Sleicher
v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929) (does apply).
' Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955).
'People ex rel. Byrnes v. Retirement Bd. of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit
Fund, 272 Ill. App. 59 (1933) ; Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637
(1948); Huntington Hospital Ass'n v. Halaby, 204 Misc. 745, 124 N.Y.S.2d 791
(County Ct. 1953); National City Bank v. Lowenstein, 197 Misc. 707, 99
N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Zuckerman v. Zuckerman, 66 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup.
Ct 1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 814, 66 N.Y.S2d 410 (1st Dep't 1946).
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The question of whether an annulment decree has the effect of rend-
ering a voidable marriage void from the beginning often arises in those
cases where a separation agreement or an alimony decree calls for
payments to terminate upon remarriage. In these cases relation back has
sometimes been applied, thereby reinstating alimony payments when the
marriage was subsequently annulled.1° But in New York a statute1 1
gives the wife the right to receive support from the husband of the
annulled marriage, thus removing the reason for reviving the obligation
of the first husband; and California has refused to apply the theory of
relation back to reinstate alimony payments on the ground that the
divorced husband after her remarriage has the right to recommit his
assets.1
2
The question of relation back also arises in cases where the question
is the validity of a second marriage entered into prior to the annulment
of the first marriage. In the North Carolina case of Taylor v. White,13
where a first marriage was annulled on the ground of duress, the court
allowed the decree to relate back and declared the marriage void ab
initio, thereby making a second marriage entered into prior to the
annulment a valid marriage.' 4 The Taylor case illustrates the violence
done to other legal principles when the doctrine of relation back is
applied to a voidable marriage. One legal principle is that a voidable
marriage is valid until avoided;15 another is that a second marriage
entered into while a valid marriage exists is bigamous and absolutely
void.16 Thus it would appear that the second marriage in Taylor was
absolutely void. Yet, it is made valid by the application of the doctrine
of relation back.
Although it may be desirable for the court to apply or refuse to apply
the doctrine of relation back depending upon the equities of the case,
"0 Sutton v. Leib, 199 F2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying Illinois law) ; Bren-
holts v. Brenholts, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (1935); Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y.
366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929). But see Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 116
N.E.2d 182 (1953) (alimony was not reinstated when wife got annulment in
California on grounds of impotency, since in Illinois impotency is not a ground for
annulment).
"I N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 1140-a, Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124
N.E.2d 290 (1954).
"2 Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955). See also Price v.
'Price, 24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938).; In re Gosnell's Estate, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 38, 146 P.2d 42 (1944) (dictum).
"160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).
"Marriages entered into through duress are voidable in North Carolina. The
only void marriages are interracial marriages and bigamous marriages. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 51-3 (Supp. 1957), State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517 (1890).
" Scarboro v. Scarboro, 233 N.C. 449, 64 S.E.2d 422 (1951). There is language
in the Scarboro case which casts some doubt on whether or not Taylor v. White
is still the law in North Carolina, but it does not overrule Taylor v. White.
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (1953). This sets out the crime of bigamy and
bigamous cohabitation. See also State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517
(1890).
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this creates uncertainties and sometimes does violence to sound legal
theory. Some of the uncertainties might be avoided if the legislative
bodies drafting statutes involving remarriage and if the judges drafting
alimony decrees would spell out to a greater extent what is meant by
remarriage.
KARL N. HILL, JR.
Searches and Seizures-Description in Warrant-Limits of Curtilage
A recent North Carolina case has presented some unique problems
in the admissibility of evidence found in the process of an unreasonable
search and seizure.' 'Vithin the same yard were two buildings, some
thirty feet apart. The first building was a house, owned and occupied
by a third party. The second building was a former filling station,
rented from the third party and occupied by the defendant. A search
warrant was obtained for the house against the third party and another
for the filling station against the defendant. The affidavit described
the defendant's "dwelling, garage, filling station, barn and outhouses and
cars and premises .... ,,2 The officer searched the filling station.
While searching the house of the third party the sheriff discovered,
for the first time, that the defendant also rented a back porch room of
the house. Despite the fact that neither the owner of the robm nor the
defendant gave his consent, the officer searched the room under the
warrant for the house. The court excluded the evidence found in the
room because it was seized in the course of an unreasonable search.
The court reached this decision upon the grounds: (1) that as
between the third party and the defendant, the defendant had the right
to invoke the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, (2) the warrant for the search of the house did not authorize a
search of the back porch room. Thus the decision of the court did not
turn upon the question of search within the curtilage. But the facts
of the case necessarily suggest this problem. The room was close
enough to be said to be in the defendant's curtilage, being within the
same yard and within thirty feet of his dwelling. There was a path
from the filling station to the room and it would appear that the room
was used by the defendant in connection with the filling station as a
habitation.3 That this problem presented itself to the minds of the
1 State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329 (1957).
2Id. at 240, 98 S.E.2d at 331.
'Apparently the limits of the curtilage are set by two primary elements: the
use of the lands and buildings in connection with the dwelling for ordinary habita-
tion and the proximity to the dwelling. State v. Lee, 120 Ore. 643, 253 Pac. 533
(1927). There is no longer any requirement that this area be enclosed by a wall




court is indicated by the fact that at the outset of the decision the court
adumbrated the point. But the court refused to hold the room an out-
house within the curtilage of the defendant's dwelling because "out-
house" was not a proper description of the room. 4 The holding of the
court is in line with the policy of strict interpretation of the unreason-
able search and seizure protection in favor of the defendant.5
But what are some of the problems involved in the relation of the
search warrant to the curtilage? It is well settled that the concept of
curtilage applies only to enlarge the protection afforded the defendant
against search without a warrant.6  It does not serve to extend the
bounds of a search warrant which does not specify a particular building
within the curtilage.7  The theory of curtilage can not be transplanted
from the realm of protecting the defendant against search without a
warrant to extending the bounds of the warrant. Search with a war-
rant is limited to those premises specifically described in the warrant,
not the premises so described plus their curtilage.8
This conclusion may lead to some difficulty if the officer finds it
necessary to search the entire property of the defendant who owns a
house near which are several structures and outlying fields. The out-
lying fields may be searched up to the bounds of the curtilage without
a search warrant, since the constitutional protection extends only to
"persons, houses, papers and effects." 9
How may the warrant describe the house and its curtilage so as
to achieve a legal search of the entire area? There are some cases which
allow a very limited search within the curtilage of dwellings not spe-
cifically described in the warrant. In one case the search warrant called
for the search of "one frame house, barns, smokehouse, and other out-
'Another element which seemed to play a part in the court's refusal to uphold
the filling station Warrant as good against the search of the room was the fear that
by doing so there would be an invasion of the rights of another property owner.
Search of two separate yards has been permitted, when connected by a path
and owned by one person. People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250 (1851). But this has
not been permitted where the two yards belong to two different people. When
there was such a search, even when specified in the warrant, it was held invalid
as a general search. State v. Duane, 100 Me. 447, 62 Atl. 80 (1905).
'79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 4 (1952).
' State v. Harrison, 239 N.C. 659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954) ; Kisselburg v. State,
56 Okl. Cr. 46, 33 P.2d 236 (1934).
" People v. Bawiec, 228 Mich. 32, 199 N.W. 702 (1924).
8 MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 35, 36 (1950).
'Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); State v. Harrison, 239 N.C.
659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954). However, in some states even the open fields are held
to be within the protection against search without a warrant. These states have
interpreted the inclusion of "possessions" among the list of things protected in the
state constitutions to mean that anything possessed by the defendant is protected
from search without a warrant. Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 198 Atl. 710 (1938) ;
Helton v. State, 136 Miss. 622, 101 So. 701 (1924). At least one state, with such
a provision in its constitution, has expressly repudiated this doctrine and held
that open fields may be searched without a search warrant. Robie v. State, 117
Tex. Cr. 283, 36 S.W. 2d 175 (1931).
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buildings . . . ."10 There was no reference in the warrant to the
grounds on which these buildings stood. But when illegal whiskey was
found in a garden ten to twenty feet from the dwelling, the court held
that the whiskey was found in a search authorized by the warrant. In
holding the search to be reasonable the court said: "[T]he description
as a whole means rather the premises occupied by the defendant as a
residence, including the named buildings, as well as such adjacent lands
as were necessary parts of the 'premises ... ."-11 But the same court,
in a later case, indicated that it would not be so liberal if the omitted
place-were a building. When the warrant merely specified the dwell-
ing, the same court did not allow any portion of the curtilage to be
searched. 12  A Tennessee case illustrates the furthest extension of an
allowance to search the curtilage when the warrant specifies only the
dwelling.' 3 The warrant authorized a search of the premises at "2706
Coward Street." Within three feet of the main building was a coal
house also marked "2706." The court allowed the search of the coal
house under the warrant because there was a search "of an outhouse
so clearly appurtenant to and a part of the same precises .... ,11 But
it would appear that this court did not hold that the curtilage can be
searched when only the house is described, but rather that the coal house
was constructively the same building as the house.
Since search within the curtilage when only the dwelling is described
in the search warrant is so strictly limited, the officer has no alternative
but to specify all objects within the curtilage which he wishes to
search. 15 It is submitted that the officer would be well advised to inform
himself of as many details of the layout of the premises to be searched
as possible." When he finds a peculiar situation, like that in the prin-
" Ingram v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 284, 286, 254 S.W. 894, 895 (1923).
22
1
d. at 286, 254 S.W. at 895.
"Fleming v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 169, 289 S.W. 212 (1926).
13 Seals v. State, 157 Tenn. 538, 11 S.W.2d 879 (1928).
1, Id. at 545, 11 S.W.2d at 881.
The term "premises" in itself presents a problem when applied to search
warrants. In trespass cases and litigation over deeds or wills it would seem
that the term may be used in its broadest sense to include the entire property
appurtenant to a specified building or general site. Winlock v. State, 121 Ind.
531, 23 N.E. 514 (1890). But when the term is used in a search warrant it is
more strictly construed as the approximate equivalent of the curtilage. Ratzell v.
State, 27 Okl. Cr. 340, 228 Pac. 166 (1924). But "premises" standing alone in a
search warrant is not sufficiently specific to permit a search. Its meaning, un-
accompanied by qualifying words or phrases, is so indefinite that the premises to be
searched are not specified adequately. Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850) ; Rig-
nall v. State. 134 Miss. 169, 98 So. 444 (1923). But "premises" plus a street ad-
dress authorizes a search of a garage on the same lot as the house. Comeaux v.
State, 118 Tex. Cr. 223, 42 S.W.2d 255 (1931).
15 It has been held that a single search warrant may specify not only a dwellinv,
but also buildinds and land within the same curtilage. Caudill v. Commonwealth,
198 Ky. 695, 249 S.W. 1005 (1923). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 864 (1953), as to
the propriety of issuing only one search warrant to search more than one place or
premise occupied by the same person.
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cipal case, specific details should not be used to the exclusion of general
terms. General terms such as "out houses," "yard," and "garden" are
common and have proved effective. 16
JAMES W. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
Taxation-Barred Claims-Equitable Recoupment
Plaintiff, as administratrix, paid estate tax on her deceased hus-
band's estate. After the period of limitations on claim for refund of
the estate tax had expired, the Commissioner assessed against the estate
a deficiency assessment for income taxes and penalties. The plaintiff
paid same and sought a refund of estate tax to accord with the resultant
decrease of the taxable estate, but was denied recovery in the district
court' because of a three year statute of limitations on refund of estate
tax.2 The plaintiff then brought suit for refund of income tax, seeking
to recoup the estate tax overpayments against the income tax deficiency
assessments, a refund of which the statute of limitations had not yet
barred. The court allowed full recovery with interest.3
The doctrine of recoupment, an equitable remedy of common law
origin, is the act of rebating a part of a claim on which one is sued, by
means of a legal or equitable right resulting from a counterclaim arising
out of the same transaction. 4 In Bull v. United States,5 the first case
in which this remedy was extended to federal taxation, the United
States Supreme Court limited recoupment to situations arising out of
"some feature of the same transaction upon which the plaintiff's claim
is grounded."6 The basic problem in recoupment cases stems from the
difficulty in determining what constitutes the same transaction.
Four times the Supreme Court has considered the matter of recoup-
1" Here follow some examples of descriptions in search warrants that were
held valid:
"a certain dwelling house, barn, garage, outbuildings and sheds located at ... 
People v. Holton, 326 Ill. 481, 158 N.E. 134 (1927); "room, house, outhouse,
yard, garden and appurtenances thereto . . . ." Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87
N.E. 103 (1909); "building and all out buildings commonly known as . .. ."
Thomson v. State, 196 Ind. 229, 147 N.E. 778 (1925); "one story frame house
and all outbuildings appurtenant thereto . . . " Goodman v. State, 201 Ind. 189,
165 N.E. 755 (1929).
1 Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 910, 53 STAT. 138 (now INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 6511).
United States v. Herring, 240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957).
80 C.J.S., Set-Off and Counterclaim § 2 (1953).
295 U.S. 247 (1935). Decedent's estate was substituted in decedent's place
in a partnership and received income therefrom. The Commissioner first incor-
rectly levied estate tax on the sum so received and, after suit for refund of this
tax was barred, he levied income tax on the same sum. The Court allowed the
taxpayer to recoup the barred estate tax overpayment against the income tax de-
ficiency correctly due on the sum.
Old. at 262.
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ment in tax cases, twice allowing the remedy-Bull v. United States
and Stone v. White7 -and twice denying it-McEachern v. Rose8
and Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.9 The McEachern case,
decided squarely on the basis of statutory provisions,' 0 presents a situa-
tion similar to that in the Bull case, yet the statutes applied in the former
were never mentioned in the latter opinion, though they were in effect at
the time involved. It is possible to argue that the McEachern and
Electric Storage Battery cases do not present same-transaction situa-
tions such as are found in the Bull and Stone cases.-' Literally this
is true in that in the latter two cases the taxable event was a single
one-the receipt of a sum of money by the taxpayer-while in the other
two cases there was no such receipt of a single fund of money. But to
adopt this criterion is to confine the doctrine of recoupment to an area
well within the boundaries established by the lower courts. Rather, the
McEachern case may be distinguished from the Bull case in that in the
former (1) recoupment was not pleaded, though the courts have held
that, to be applied, it must be pleaded, 12 and (2) the Commissioner did
not introduce into evidence the amount sought to be recouped.' 8 Fur-
thermore, the Court never mentioned the McEachern case in the Electric
Storage Battery decision, which leads one to suspect that the Court
7301 U.S. 532 (1937). Testamentary trustees paid tax on trust income which
should have been paid by the beneficiary. After the statute had run on an action
by the government to collect the tax from the beneficiary, the trustees brought an
action to recover their erroneous tax payment. The Court allowed the government
to recoup the barred amount due from the beneficiary against the refund of the
erreoneous payment by the trustees.
8 302 U.S. 56 (1937). Decedent sold a block of stock and agreed to be paid in
equal yearly payments. The administrator, plaintiff in this action, erroneously
reported as income of the estate each installment in the year received, instead of
cumulating the remaining installments and reporting them as estate assets. After
the statute of limitations had run on the year in which the estate tax was paid, the
plaintiff brought this action to recover the income tax paid as a result of reporting
the installments as yearly income. The Court refused to allow the government to
recoup the barred estate tax deficiency of the earlier year against the refund of in-
come tax paid in the later years.
9 329 U.S. 296 (1946). Plaintiff paid excise tax which was not due under the
statute although assessed by the Commissioner. Subsequently the Commissioner
realized that the tax was illegal and refunded the amounts paid in years not yet
barred. Plaintiff owed income tax on this refund but sought to recoup the amount
of barred excise tax overpayments against the income tax deficiency. The Court
denied recoupment.
"0 If a tax may not be refunded or collected because barred by statutes of
limitations, a credit or debit therefor may not be made by the Commissioner.
Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 607-609, 45 STAT. 874, 875 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 6401(a), 6514(a), (b)). "These provisions preclude the government
from taking any benefit from the taxpayer's overpayment by crediting it against
an unpaid tax whose collection has been barred by limitation." 302 U.S. at 60.
11329 U.S. at 299-300.
"Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955); First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 647 (W.D.S.C. 1954); cf. Bull. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 247, 263 (1935).
" McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment in Federal Taxation, 28 VA. L.
Rrv. 577, 594 (1942).
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may not regard McEachern as limiting the scope of recoupment. More-
over, in the Eletcric Storage Battery case, the Court expressly stated
that its intention was to narrow the scope of the recoupment doctrine in
the tax field, and it rested the decision on the grounds that (1) there
were separate transactions here, and (2) the age of the barred claim
was too great.14 It is possible to infer from the language of the Court
that the compelling reason for the denial of recoupment was that it
would be unwise policy to allow claims over twenty years old to be
asserted in recoupment. 15 In any event, both cases denying recoupment
are frequently cited and are strongly relied upon by the lower courts
and the Commissioner to defeat recoupment even in situations where
the remedy seemingly should be applied.'
6
Recoupment is invariably applied where the fund of money is the
same in the main claim as in the one asserted in recoupment. This
situation occurs most frequently where, as in the principal case, an estate
is diminished by a deficiency income tax assessment after the estate tax
thereon has been paid and suit is brought to recoup the barred estate
tax overpayment against the income tax deficiency payment.' 7 There
must always be some obligation on which the statute has not run against
which the barred estate tax overpayment may be recouped. 18 Both
claims, moreover, must be between the same parties,' 9 except in the
trust situation hereinafter considered. Although there is no case
authority to support such a position, the Commissioner has indicated
that recoupment will not be allowed even where all of these require-
ments are met.20
The trust cases offer an interesting variant in that the parties to the
transaction are not literally the same. Nonetheless, the government in
the Stone case recouped a barred deficiency of the beneficiary against
a recovery by the trustees on the ground that any recovery by the latter
14329 U.S. at 302-03.
McConnell, Recoupment-Dead or Alive, 26 TAXES 1059, 1060 (1948).
18 Rev.. Rul. 226, 1955-1 Cum. BUIL. 469.
', United States v. Herring,, 240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957) ; Dunigan v. United
States, 87 Ct. Cl. 404, 23 F. Supp. 467 (1938). Recoupment was denied in
Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955), and in a case cited
therein, First Natl Bank v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 647 (W.D.S.C. 1954),
because the plaintiff brought suit for a refund of estate tax rather than a
recoupment of an estate tax overpayment against the still open income tax. Contra,
Reeves v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
18 United States v. Frauenthal, 138 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1943) (estate decreased
by an obligation to a party other than the government).
"Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 245 F.2d 524 (9th
Cir. 1957) (court refused to recoup a barred deficiency of a widow's estate against
a claim for refund due the widow's husband's estate, even though the beneficiaries
of each were the same).
"Rev. Rul. 226, 1955-1 Cum. Bu.LL 469.
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would inure automatically to the benefit of the former.2 ' Conversely,
recoupment was not applied to offset a barred deficiency of the trustees
against an overpayment by the beneficiary. 22 Moreover, the settlor is
considered a separate entity from both the trustee and the beneficiary,
thus precluding recoupment.2 3 Although there is an early decision to
the contrary,24 it seems erroneous to consider all relations between the
trust and any other entity a single transaction merely because the trust
involved is the same.
The courts appear very reluctant to grant recoupment where there
has been procedurally inconsistent tax treatment of the same property
as distinguished from essentially inconsistent treatment of the identical
fund of money as in the Bull case. Recoupment has been denied the
government where the taxpayer incorrectly treated the receipt of
property as a gift25 or as incidental to a tax-free reorganization,2 0 thus
avoiding the payment of income tax in the year of receipt and then,
after that year was barred, correctly viewing the receipt transaction so
as to effect a substantial reduction in the capital gains tax due as a
result of subsequent sale. Likewise the government was not allowed
to recoup the income tax due in several barred years of receipt against
a refund of income tax resulting from the incorrect cumulative report-
ing of the income, theretofore unreported, in the current year.2 But
where the Commissioner approved taxpayer's erroneous method of
computing gain from liquidating dividends and subsequently reversed his
earlier decision, thereby causing an income tax overpayment in the now
barred year of receipt and an income tax deficiency in open years, re-
coupment was allowed the taxpayer.
28
However, the taxpayer was not allowed to recoup the income tax
he would have saved in a now barred year if he had correctly reported
certain deductions against the additional income tax owed because of a
disallowance of the deduction in an open year,20 even though, in one
21 Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937); First Nat'l Bank v. United States,
12 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ala. 1935).
-"Lyman v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 14 (D. Mass. 1938).
" Silverthau v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 242 (D. Conn. 1938).
2 Lit v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1937). The barred de-
ficiency was a gift tax due on the establishment of the trust and the overpayment
was in connection with an incorrect valuation of a reversionary interest in the
trust which settlor had at his death.
"5 Crawford v. Heiner, 23 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
"' American Light & Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1944);
Rotenberg v. Sheehan, 48 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Mo. 1943), appeal dismissed, 144
F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1944).
27 Grand Central Public Market v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal.
1938), aff'd, 98 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1938).
2 Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 78 (M.D.N.Y. 1940).
"Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Longyear Realty Co. v.
Kavanagh, 156 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1946); Hall v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 539,
43 F. Supp. 130, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 664 (1942).
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of the cases,30 the Commissioner had refused to allow the deductions
when they were properly put forth. But the government was allowed
to recoup a barred corporate income tax deficiency resulting from the'
taxpayer's deduction in a single year of tooling costs properly de-
preciable over three years against the total overpayments of corporate
income tax which resulted from later assigning the deduction pro-
portionately to the proper years which were still open. 3 1
On one occasion the taxpayer was allowed to recoup barred over-
payments resulting from an erroneously assessed excise tax against open
income tax deficiencies resulting from the refund of that portion of the
excise tax paid and not yet barred.32  In another case the taxpayer was
allowed to recoup an income tax deficiency in open years resulting from
an erroneous allocation of an excess profits tax compromise.33 ' In these
two cases the courts reason that both deficiencies and overpayments are
caused by a single erroneous act, either by the Commissioner or the
taxpayer, and therefore arise out of the same transaction. This ground
for allowing recoupment was not considered in two subsequently de-
cided, widely cited cases.
3 4
Recoupment is an equitable remedy and will be denied if the party
seeking to have it applied is guilty of fraud. 5 Nor may the remedy
be applied by the Tax Court, since its jurisdiction is limited to the
single year under consideration at that time.3 6  Furthermore, Xecoup-
ment will not be granted if there is any other adequate remedy.
37 In
this regard it is interesting to note that for twenty years there have been
statutory provisions apparently intended and able to rectify many of
the situations described above, but the courts have not referred to-these
provisions in the later recoupment cases.
38
80 Hall v. United States, supra note 29.
1 Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
" Dixie Margarine Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940).'
" Pond's Extract Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 43, 134 F. Supp. 476 (1955).
" Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946) ; Lynchburg
Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 517, 47 F. Supp. 916 (1942).
"8J. J. Dix, Inc. v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955); Elberl v.
Johnson, 164 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1947). But see United States v. Herring, 240
F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957), where fraud penalties were assessed." Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943).
7 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 245 F.2d 524, 536
(9th Cir. 1957).8 Revenue Act of 1938, § 820, 52 STAT. 581 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 1311-1314), which provides for the suspension of the bar of limitations on a
claim where the party in whose favor the statute has run seeks (1) a double in-
clusion or exclusion of an item in or from gross income, (2) a double allowance or
disallowance of a deduction or credit, (3) the allowance or disallowance of
correlative deductions or inclusions for certain related taxpayers, or (4) a different
determination of basis after the erroneous treatment of a prior transaction. In
the Wells Fargo case, supra note 37, the court stated one of its reasons for denying
recoupment to be the existence of these provisions affording a statutory remedy.
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CONCLUSION
In spite of frequent statements to the contrary, 9 the doctrine of re-
coupment in federal taxation still lives, as evidenced by the many
recent cases which employ it to effect an equitable result seemingly
otherwise unobtainable because of the specific language of the statutes
barring the claim. The taxes must arise out of the same transaction
and the parties in interest must be the same. The longer the period of
time which the transaction covers, the more doubtful is the application
of the doctrine by the courts. If fresh claims could be created by act
of one of the parties in favor of the other to enable the creator to recoup
barred claims, the whole policy of barring claims would be defeated and
no equities demand the application of the remedy.40 Like most other
problems in law, questions such as "What constitutes a single taxable
event or the same transaction ?" and "How long is too long ?" may never
be finally answered but can only be circumscribed by recurring decisions.
JOEL L. FLEISHMAN
Tort Claims Act-Distinction between Nonfeasance and Misfeasance
In Flynn v. State Highway Commn,1 plaintiff's intestate was killed
when the truck in which he was a passenger was wrecked as a result
of its wheel striking a hole in the road, causing its driver to lose con-
trol. In plaintiff's action against the state for negligence in leaving the
road in disrepair, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, which
had affirmed the Industrial Commission, holding that the Tort Claims
Act covers only negligent acts by state employees and not negligent
omissions. In reaching this decision the court stated:
In order to authorize the payment of compensation, the Industrial
Commission's finding must include (1) a negligent act, (2) on
the part of a state employee, (3) while acting in the scope of his
employment, etc. The first requirement is that the claimant
show a negligent act. Is a failure to repair a hole in the high-
way caused by ordinary public travel a negligent act? The re-
quirement of the statute is not met by showing negligence, for
negligence may consist of an act or an omission. Failure to act
is not an act. We think it was the intent of the legislature to
permit recovery only for the negligent acts of its employees, for
the things done by them, not for the things left undone. If the
intent had been otherwise, it would have been easy to permit
recovery for the negligent acts and omissions of State employees.
2
" Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1954).
"0 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Finnegan, 53-1 CCH U.S. TAx CAS. 119299
(E.D. Mo. 1953).
1244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).
21d. at 620, 94 S.E.2d at 572.
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The provision of the Tort Claims Act that recovery may be had
only for a negligent act3 considerably limits the state's tort liability.
Negligence is usually defined as the failure to use due care, or to act as
a reasonably prudent man would act under the same or similar circum-
stances. 4  It is generally recognized that negligence may consist of
either a negligent act or a negligent omission to act.5 Indeed, the court
in the principal case recognized as much in the language quoted above.
The distinction between acts and omissions seems not to have pene-
trated the field of municipal liability for torts committed by its agents
either in North Carolina or other states. There is accord among the
courts as to the rule of liability of municipal corporations.6 A munici-
pality is generally held liable for failure to maintain its streets, even
though maintenance of streets is a governmental and not a proprietary
function; liability does not usually attach to negligent performance by a
municipality of a governmental function.7 By statute8 in North Carolina
there is imposed on municipalities the positive duty to maintain streets in
a reasonably safe condition for travel, and negligent failure to do so will
result in liability for proximate injury.9 Many of the cases arising
against municipalities have concerned negligent omissions10 rather than
negligent acts. If these'actions had been brought under the Tort Claims
Act there seems no reason to doubt that the plaintiff would have had
no chance of recovery.
It is very hard to find fault with the decision in the Flynn case.
The court has in the past committed itself to a strict construction of
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1952).
' Barnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N.C. 721, 83 S.E.2d 89.8 (1954); Rea v. Simowitz,
225 N.C. 575, 35 S.E.2d 871 (1945); PROSSER, TORTS § 31 (2d ed. 1955).
' "If the defendant enters upon an affirmative course of conduct affecting the
interest of another, he is regarded as assuming a duty to act, and, will therefore
be liable for negligent acts or omissions." (Emphasis added.) PROSSER, TORTS
§ 38c (2d ed. 1955). Mikeal v. Pendleton, 237 N.C. 690, 75 S.E.2d 756 (1953) ;
Diamond v. McDonald Service Stores, 211 N.C. 632, 191 S.E. 358 (1937); Ham-
ilton v. Southern Ry., 200 N.C. 543, 158 S.E. 75 (1931).
' "Apart from statute late decisions in a majority of the states affirm implied
municipal liability to private actions for injuries resulting from defective public
ways. In other words, the right to recover, against a city for actionable negligence
for defects in its streets and sidewalks is based on the common law, and requires
no statute to proclaim it." 7 McQuiLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2901 (rev.
ed. 1945).
"Glenn v. Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 479, 98 S.E2d 913, 920 (1957) (concurring
opinion); Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 97 (1957).
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-54 (1952).
'Hunt v. High Point, 226 N.C. 74, 36 S.E.2d 694 (1946); Millar v. Wilson,
222 N.C. 340, 23 S.E.2d 42 (1942) ; Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884).
" Hunt v. High Point, 226 N.C. 74, 36 S.E.2d 694 (1946) (failure to provide
handrail and to furnish adequate lighting) ; Beaver v. China Grove, 222 N.C. 234,
22 S.E.2d 434 (1942) (failure to erect caution signs; manhole cover allowed to
protrude) ; Waters v. Belhaven, 222 N.C. 20, 21 S.E.2d 840 (1942) (wire hoops
not removed from street) ; Love v. Asheville, 210 N.C. 476, 187 S.E. 562 (1936)
(failure to clear ice from bridge).
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the act." Our court is not alone in this view, 12 the reason being that a
statute creating sovereign liability is in derogation of the common law
and grants a right not naturally accorded the citizens of a state.18
Argument cannot validly be based on the proposition that the legis-
lature intended the act to include negligent omissions as well as neg-
ligent acts. As is pointed out in the Flynn case, the legislature
amended the Tort Claims Act in March 1955 by inserting the words
"or omission" after the words "negligent act."'14 This amendment may
indicate that the legislature did not consider them as part of the original
act. In May 1955 the act was again amended to strike out the words
"or omission" from the amended version. 15  These two amendments
indicate the unmistakable intent of the legislature to exclude state
liability for negligent omissions, so that the court's interpretation of
legislative intent is unimpeachable.
Many fears account for continuation of the principle of govern-
mental immunity. Perhaps the chief one is the fear that the public coffers
cannot stand the strain which would be thrust upon them by the insti-
tution of many suits demanding damages for torts. Time has shown
that this fear is not valid. In allowing recovery for torts all states have
found that this expense constitutes but a very minute part of total
annual expenditures. 16 This fear coupled with reluctance to depart
from a well worn path are, perhaps, why the legislature let caution
be its watchword. There is an obvious inequality in allowing the plain-
tiff injured by a negligent act to recover, while denying recovery to
the plaintiff injured as a result of an equally negligent omission to act.
It is submitted that the act should be amended so as to make the state
liable for the negligence of its employees "in accordance with the same
rules of law'as applied to action . . . against individuals and corpora-
tions.'" The adoption of this amendment would bring North Carolina
in line with the New York and federal view of governmental liability,
which is that the government is liable the same as private parties.'8
JESsE M. HENLEY, JR.
11Jenkins v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577
(1956), 35 N.C.L. REv. 564 (1957); Floyd v. State Highway Comm'n, 244 N.C.
461, 85 S.E.2d 703 (1955).12 Borchard, Government Liabiilty in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
IS Borchard, supra note 12, at 9.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 400.
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1361.
1" Anderson, Recovery from the United States Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 31 MINN. L. REv. 465 (1947).1 1N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8.
1860 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2674 (1952) ; N.Y. Cr. CL. ACT § 8.
There has been little or no symmetry in the adoption by the states of tort
claims acts. Indeed there are few states that have a unified act or group of
statutes which might be termed a tort claims act. Many states have constitutional
provisions which prohibit the state from being made a defendant in a tort action.
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Torts-Libel and Slander-Extemporaneous Defamatory Remarks
Over Television
In Shor v. Billingsley' the defendant made extemporaneous defama-
tory statements on a television program. Plaintiff pleaded three causes
of action for defamation. All alleged the statements were false and
uttered for the express purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his business.
The first cause of action presented the principal problem in the case:
Whether extemporaneous defamatory words in a telecast constitute
libel or slander.2 The defendants argued that no cause of action was
stated3 because there was no permanent physical form present in an ex-
temporaneous telecast4 and that the application of the law of libel to
broadcasting or telecasting without a script must be made (if at all)
by the legislature rather than by the courts.5 The court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss for insufficiency and held that the de-
famatory telecast would be treated as libel. Thus, no special damages
need be alleged.
The civil action of libel was first announced in 1670 by Lord Chief
Baron Hale in King v. Lake6 in the Exchequer.7 A distinction was
drawn between the old civil action for slander and the new tort of libel on
the basis of permanence or nonpermanence of form. Written defama-
tion, being of more permanent duration, was considered the more harm-
The majority of these states, however, allow the legislature to waive this im-
munity. Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1363 (1954).
'4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
' The second cause of action alleged that the statements were read from a
prepared script or notes. The court held this to be libel and relied on Hartmann
v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947). The third cause of action
alleged that a motion picture was made of the telecast which was later exhibited.
This, the court held, was also libel, citing Brown v. Paramount-Publix Corp.,
240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y. Supp. 544 (3d Dep't 1934), and Ostrowe v. Lee,
296 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931). A fourth cause of action was for invasion
of privacy and was considered separately by the court.
'The defendants apparently contended that if there was an action it was in
slander and that the remarks were not slanderous per se. Therefore, it was con-
tended, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for failure to allege special
damages.
"To support this propositon the defendants cited the words of Chief Justice
Cardozo in Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931): "The
schism in the law of defamation between the older wrong of slander and the newer
one of libel is not the product of mere accident. . . . It has its genesis in evils
which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said
with impunity through the medium of speech. No so, however, when speech is
caught upon the wing and transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the
writing is its permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written
one abides and 'perpetuates the scandal.'" (Emphasis added.)
' Such legislation has been enacted in England. Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16
Go. 6 & 1 ELIZ. 2, c. 66; see Note, 66 HARv. L. REV. 476 (1953).
'Hardres 470, Skinner 124 (1670).
" Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L.
REv. 546, 569-70 (1903).
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ful and was labeled libel. The lesser tort of oral defamation remained
the tort of slander, it being of temporary duration and thus less harmful.
Libel was held to be a wrongful act per se, damage being presumed.,
The permanence of form test was followed in the common law courts
and was finally settled in 1812 by Lord Mansfield in Thorley v. Lord
Kerry,9 on the ground that though indefensible in principle, the dis-
tinction was too well established to be repudiated.10
The customary distinctions between libel and slander were readily
adapted to new conditions with relatively little difficulty until the courts
were confronted with defamation through radio" and television.1
2
Initially the problem was resolved within the traditional bounds of def-
amation, since the earlier cases involved reading from a prepared script
and the courts could draw an analogy to the reading aloud of a defama-
tory writing, which has long been considered libelous.13
The courts encountered their greatest difficulty in cases where the
words broadcast were extemporaneous. The law in this area remains
in a state of flux, and three views have evolved.
Locke v. Gibbons14 represents one view. There the court reasoned
that not only should the potentiality for harm be considered, but the
element of permanence of form as well. The court likened a radio broad-
caster's extemporaneous speech to a speech delivered over an amplifier to
a vast audience in a stadium and concluded that both involve the spoken
word and that both are slanderous.
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.' 5 announced a
second view. The court concluded that defamation by radio was a new
tort with rules of its own, since it did not fall within the traditional rules
of libel or slander. The court failed to indicate what the rules for the
new tort would be and decided the case on the question of negligence in
leasing the transmitting facilities.
A third view, long advocated by legal writers on the subject, 16 was
given substance in a concurring opinion in Hartmann v. Winchell.
17
' For a discussion of the history of defamation, see Veeder, The History and
Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 546 (1903). See also
PROSSER, TORTS C. 19 (2d ed. 1955); Barry, Radio, Television and the Law of
Defamation, 23 AusR. L.J. 203 (1949); PLUCKNETr, A CoxcisE HISTORY o TIHE
Commox LAw 454 (4th ed. 1948); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Tim HISTORY 0
ENGLISH LAW 536-38 (2d ed. 1898) ; Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1956).
'4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
10 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 568, comment b (1938).
"Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed per
ceuriam, KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933).
" Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
"Forrester v. Tyrrell, 9 T.L.R. 258 (1893).
" 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd menr., 253 App.
Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938).
15366 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
16 PROSSER, TORTS § 93, p. 595 (2d ed. 1955).
"296 N.Y. 296, 300, 73 N.E.2d 30, 32 (1947) (concurring opinion).
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There Justice Fuld argued that the primary reason for broader liability
for libel than slander has been the greater capacity for harm that a
writing is assumed to have because of its wide range of dissemination
consequent upon its permanence of form; that the audience of radio is
often greater than that of the nation's largest newspapers; that the fact
that defamation by radio in the absence of a script or transcription lacks
the measure of durability possessed by libel in no way lessens its capacity
for harm; that the element of damage is historically the basis for a
common law action for defamation; and that it is as reasonable to
presume damage from the nature of the medium employed when def-
amation is broadcast by radio as when published by writing. On these
grounds Justice Fuld concluded that both logic and policy point to the
result that defamation by radio is actionable per se.' 8
In the principal case the court, in disposing of the defendants' con-
tention that no cause of action was stated because there was no per-
manence of form in an extemporaneous telecast, concluded that Locke
v. Gibbons was not controlling because of circumstances, indicating that
the lower court's dismissal in that case was affirmed on the ground that
the words complained of were not set forth in the complaint ;19 adopted
the reasoning of the concurring opinion in the Hartmann case ;20 cited
the work of legal writers in support of that reasoning ;21 and regarded the
language of Chief Justice Cardozo in Ostrowe v. Lee22 as not pre-
cluding recovery since the court there was not restricting the law of libel,
but extending it. The "permanence of form," the court said, was not
historically a prerequisite to libel, but was one factor which justified an
extension of liability.
23
In rejecting the defendants' argument that the application of the law
of libel to extemporaneous broadcasting must be made by the legislature,
the court observed that it is the duty of the courts to extend an estab-
lished rule of law to new technological developments. 24  The court
pointed out that a case of first impression does not always present a
problem for the legislature nor does it follow that there is no remedy
for a wrong done, "because every form of action, when brought for
the first time, must have been without a precedent to support it."
'25
Furthermore, said the court, "We act in the finest common-law tradition
21 Id. at 304, 73 N.E.2d at 34.
0 Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 860, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 480 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
20 Id. at 861, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 480-81.
21 Id. at 861-63, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 481-83.
22 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931). See note 4 supra.
2 Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 864, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 484 (Sup. Ct.
1956).2 ' Ibid.
" Id. at 866, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 486, quoting from Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y.
176, 178, 44 N.E. 773, 774 (1896).
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when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense jus-
fice."
26
The court cast aside the ancient technical distinctions between libel
and slander based upon permanence of form and based its decision on
the capacity for harm. In so doing, the court has taken a great stride
forward in adapting the common law to the changing nature of human
affairs.
MAX D. BALLINGER
,Torts--Res Ipsa Loquitur-Malpractice Cases
The plaintiff's arm was fractured during electro-shock treatment ad-
ministered by the defendant psychiatrist. His suit for damages was on
two different theories: breach of warranty and negligence. Defendant
psychiatrist moved for summary judgment. The court in Johnston v.
Rodis1 granted the motion.
The court disposed of the breach of warranty theory by saying, "An
expression of opinion on the part of a physician that a particular course
of treatment is safe, does not constitute a warranty . . . . [H]e is
answerable only for negligence."
'2
The negligence theory also failed as the court also held that no spe-
cific negligence was charged and that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
In order to have the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, the plaintiff
must show the existence of three conditions. 3 The accident or injury
must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence, 4 there must be a reasonable inference that the
defendant is responsible for the negligence which caused the injury,
6
and it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the plaintiff.6  The malpractice cases in which plaintiffs
-"Ibid., quoting from Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691,
694 (1951).
1151 F. Supp. 345 (D.C. 1957), rev'd, -F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1958). The court
reversed on the warranty theory but upheld the district court on the negligence
theory and agreed that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
2 Id. at 348.
'PRossER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
' Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E2d 242 (1941) (res ipsa loquitur
applied where gauze sponge was left buried in plaintiff's hip).
"The control at one time or another of one or more of the various agencies
or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of
every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This we think places
on them the burden of initial explanation." Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486,
492, 154 P.2d 690 (1944) (non-suit reversed); Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949) (on re-trial judgment for plaintiff against all
defendants affirmed, defendants offered no explanation of injury). See also Arm-
strong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935) (gauze sponge left in
abdominal cavity following Caesarean section); PROSsER, ToRTs § 42 (2d ed.
1955).




have relied on res ispa loquitur divide into two main groups. There
are "those in which the action is based solely upon the unsuccessful or
bad result of the diagnosis or treatment,7 and those in which the action
is based on specific acts by or omission of the physician or surgeon."
8
In the former group there is generally no recovery, while in the latter,
res ipsa loquitur is frequently applied by the courts.
Within the latter group, the application of res ipsa loquitur is gen-
erally limited to some variation of two basic fact situations. One sit-
uation arises where a foreign object left in the body of the plaintiff
causes the injury. The other is where there is a "distinct injury to a
healthy part of the body not the subject of treatment nor within the
area covered by the operation."'1
In the principal case the court, in following the common law of
Maryland, stated that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be
invoked in an action for malpractice against a physician or surgeon,""
and that the only exception to the above rule "consists of cases where
the undesirable result is such that it is evident even to a layman and
could not have occurred except for the doctor's negligence."' 12 The
stated exception is a not uncommon test used by those courts which
ostensibly support the doctrine in malpractice cases to determine
whether res ipsa loquitur will apply in the particular case.'8 It seems
on close analysis that the court in the principal case, while outwardly
rejecting the doctrine in actions for malpractice, might actually apply
it: (1) where a foreign object left in the body caused the injury, and
(2) where the injury was to a healthy part of the body not involved in
treatment.
In addition to Bettigole v. Diener,.4 on which the court relied in the
instant case as stating the law in Maryland, the court also leaned
heavily on two cases on all fours with the principal case. In Farber v.
Lippard v. Johnson, 215 N.C. 384, 1 S.E.2d 889 (1939) (administration of local
anesthetic); Davis v. Pittman, 212 N.C. 680, 194 S.E. 97 (1937) (X-ray burn);
see Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1250 (1923), stating that "the general practitioner of
medicine or of surgery does not, in the absence of his special contract, impliedly
warrant the success of his treatment or operation, but does guarantee to possess
and carefully to apply such professional skill and learning as are ordinarily
possessed by general medical practitioners in the locality in which he practices."
I Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941); Pendergraft
v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932) (broken glass left in woman's
body after operation) ; Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1265 (1946).
'Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941), 19 N.C.L. REv.
617. See also Meredith, Responsibility of Surgeons, 34 CAN. B. Ray. 1192 (1956).
21 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See also Notes, 18
Miss. L.J. 448 (1947), 9 U. DEr. L.J. 51 (1945), 63 HARv. L. Rav. 643 (1950).
11 151 F. Supp. at 347. 12 Id. at 348.
"1 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 510, 254 P.2d 520, 524 (1953).
14210 Md. 537, 124 A.2d 265 (1956) (plaintiff suffered facial paralysis due to
nerve damage following a mastoidectomy in which the facial nerve was. exposed,.
verdict directed for defendant).
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Olkon' 5 and Quinley v. Cooke,16 electro-shock treatment resulted in
fractures and res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable. In considering
these two cases, the reason for not applying the doctrine becomes ap-
parent. In both cases defendant introduced evidence on trial tending to
negate the condition that the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence.' 7 In both cases
expert testimony brought out the fact that fractures were "calculated
risks of the treatment"'- which involved the entire body, and that such
accidents do happen without negligence. It is worthy of mention that
the Bettigole case and all the cases therein cited'0 as authority to sup-
port the result involved fact situations falling within the first general
group of cases where the action was based solely on the bad result of
treatment and in which it is doubtful that any court would apply the
doctrine.
2 0
It appears that no malpractice case has reached the North Carolina
Supreme Court since 1941 in which res ispa loquitur was relied on and
applied. To date, this bears out the prediction in this Law Review2 '
that the formula announced in Covington v. James2 2 probably would
not be widely extended. This formula would allow the application of
res ipsa loquitur "in any case where the result reached was 'grotesquely
contrary to all human experience.' ",23 Since then, the doctrine has been
mentioned in several opinions involving malpractice, but in none of
these opinions does it appear that the plaintiff expressly relied on it,
and it was ruled inapplicable in all cases.
24
JEAN M. LUCK
1 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953).
1 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946).
17 25 Cal. 2d at 489, 154 P.2d at 689.
18 40 Cal. 2d at 511, 254 P.2d at 525.
" State v. Baltimore Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital, 177 Md. 517, 10 A.2d
(1940) (patient died of a blood clot on the lungs following a tonsillectomy, verdict
directed for defendant) ; Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 171 At. 49 (1934) (dentist
filled a tooth which later abscessed, was entitled to a directed verdict) ; Street v.
Hodgson, 139 Md. 137, 115 At. 27 (1921) (plaintiff burned by X-ray, no infer-
ence of negligence from burn alone); Augalo v. Hallar, 137 Md. 227, 112 Atl. 179
(1920) (dentist attempted to remove roots of tooth, plaintiff's infected jaw be-
came worse) ; Miller v. Leib, 109 Md. 414, 72 At. 466 (1909) (plaintiff alleged
specific negligence) ; State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 Atl. 382 (1889)
(woman operated on for breast cancer later died).
Cf. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955) (metal sliver
lodged near the base of plaintiff's neck, nerve injured in removal caused loss of
use of one hand) ; Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1953) (plain-
tiff while being treated for a skin condition through the use of arsensic developed
other symptoms alleged to be caused by arsenic) ; Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. 1,
76 S.E.2d 461 (1953) (X-ray burn). In none of the above cases was res ipsa
loquitur found applicable.
"Note, 19 N.C.L. REV. 617 (1941). 2214 N.C. 71, 197 S.E. 701 (1938).
"2 Note, 19 N.C.L. Ray. 617, 619 (1941) quoting 214 N.C. at 76, 197 S.E. at
701.
" See cases cited note 20 supra.
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Torts-Statutory and Common Law Duty to Label Poisons
In Porter v. Yoder & Gordon Co.1 the plaintiff contracted to paint
municipal water tanks and acting pursuant to a provision therein ordered
from defendant litharge2 in powdered-form to mix with red lead paint.
The only labeling on the litharge containers was "Lev-L-Lite Paint
Products-Litharge-Manufactured by Yoder & Gordon. Company-Estab-
lished 1904-Norfolk, Virginia." In mixing the litharge with the
paint, the plaintiff and four of his employees sustained lead poisoning.
Basing his action solely upon a poison labeling statute,3 plaintiff sued
the defendant for negligence in failing to label its product as poison.
By this theory plaintiff was attempting to establish defendant's viola-
tion of the statute as negligence per se.4 The jury found the defendant
negligent and the plaintiff not contributorily negligent.
The supreme court reversed and entered a nonsuit against plaintiff,
holding as a natter of law that the statute was inapplicable as it related
to "Pharmacy" and to the sale of medicines containing poisonous in-
gredients.5 There had been no previous litigation in the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in regard to this statute.6
'246 N.C. 398, 98 S.E.2d 497 (1957).
'Litharge is principally lead monoxide, which is dangerous if inhaled or
ingested. In powdered form, it is even more dangerous because of the suscepti-
bility of being breathed. When mixed with paint, litharge dries the paint quickly
and gives it hardness.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-77 (1950). "Poisons; sales regulated; label; penalties.-
It shall be unlawful for any persons to sell or deliver to any person any of the fol-
lowing described substances or any poisonous compound, combination or preparation
thereof, to wit: The compounds and salts of arsenic, antimony, lead, mercury,
silver, zinc .... except in the manner following: It shall first be learned by due
inquiry that the person to whom delivery is made is aware of the poisonous char-
acter of the substance, and that it is desired for a lawful purpose, and the box,
bottle, or other package shall be labeled with the name of the substance, the word
'Poison' and the name of the person or firm dispensing the substance .... : Pro-
vided further, that it shall not be necessary to place a poison label upon, or to
record the delivery of, the sulphide or antimony or the dioxide or carbonate of zinc
or lead, or of colors ground in oil and intended for use as paint ....
"If any person shall sell or deliver to any person any poisonous substance speci-
fied in this section without labeling the same and recording the delivery thereof
in the manner prescribed, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less
than twenty-five nor more than one hundred dollars." (Emphasis added.)
It is obvious that litharge is not expressly exempted by the statute from
being labeled "poison." Logically it would seem to follow that litharge is enu-
merated by statute as requiring a "poison" label.
'Violation of a criminal statute unless otherwise provided is negligence per se
in a civil action. Hinson v. Dawson, 241 N.C. 714, 86 S.E.2d 585 (1955) ; Aldridge
v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E.2d 331 (1954).
'Chapter 90 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is entitled "Medicine
and Allied Professions." Article 4 is entitled "Pharmacy." Part 2 of the article
is captioned "Dealing in Specific Drugs Regulated."
' This fact may have helped the defendant. "Long acquiescence in the practical
interpretation of a statute is entitled to great weight in arriving at its meaning. It
is not thought that the real intent of the enactment could have been so generally
misunderstood for years on end.' State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 587, 31 S.E.2d
858, 862 (1944).
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Under the doctrines of ejusdem generis and strict construction of
penal statutes8 the meaning of the statute was restricted so as not to
apply to the sale of this commercial paint ingredient. Once strict con-
struction is adopted, the decision is sound.9 There is no North Caro-
lina case in point, so the court used two extra-jurisdictional cases, Boyd
v. Frenchee Chemical Co.10 and McClaren v. G. S. Robins Co.," as
authority.
The Boyd case lends support to the decision of the court in the
principal case. Plaintiff's intestate, nineteen months old, drank a bottle
of shoe cleaner labeled only by its trade name. Action was brought
under a Pennsylvania statute under the "Pharmacy" section requiring
labeling of poisons. The court held for defendant, stating that although
the definition of poison contained in the statute could include the shoe
cleaner, the statute could not be construed to regulate the sale of
products having no connection with pharmacy. Possibly a distinguish-
ing factor in this case is the statement that "the very name of the
product must have brought home to the parents the knowledge that
it was a 'fabric cleaner' and not something that their child should
drink, and certainly the word 'poison,' even though it was carried
""The statutory construction of the 'ejusdem generis' rule is that, where the
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." John L. Roper Lumber
Co. v. Lawson, 195 N.C. 840, 846, 143 S.E. 847, 850 (1928). "The rule of ejusdem
generis is based on the theory that if the legislature had intended general words
to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have made no mention of particular
classes." In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1938). Thus in the
principal case the words "any persons" mean any persons within the practice of
pharmacy according to the ejusdem generis construction.
' State v. Jordon, 224 N.C. 579, 42 S.E.2d 674 (1947); State v. Heath, 199
N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930); Hines v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 95 N.C. 434
(1886).
' McGee v. Bennett, 72 Ga. App. 271, 33 S.E.2d 577 (1945) (the doctrine of
ejusdem generis applied to statutes prescribing label of fungicides). "The con-
struction and operation of penal statutes relating to poisons are governed by the
general principles applicable to all statutes, and such statutes, where penal in
nature, are strictly construed and will not be extended by implication beyond their
express terms." 72 C.J.S., Poisons § 4 (1951).
" 37 F. Supp. 306 (D.C.N.Y. 1941).
" 349 Mo. 653, 163 S.W.2d 856 (1942). Deceased, a workman, was cleaning
a boiler with carbon tetrachloride. Breathing the fumes caused his death. It
seems that he did not use proper care in procuring adequate ventilation. Wrongful
death action was brought by administratrix under a statute requiring "every
druggist or other person who shall sell . . . any arsenic, strychnine . . . or other
substance . .. usually denominated as poisonous, without having the word 'poison'
... thereon, shall be fined $25." ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 38, § 184 (1937). There are
other cases which support the North Carolina court's decision. Levin v. Musser,
110 Neb. 515, 194 N.W. 672 (1923) (deceased drank poisonous non-medicinal oil.
The regulatory statute applied only to poisons if they were articles of medicine) ;
Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Price, 146 Miss. 192, 111 So. 437 (1927)
(sparkler fireworks were eaten by a child. The statute was held to apply only
to sale of poisons by druggists, thereby exempting defendant).
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on the package, would not have deterred a nineteen month old infant
from drinking the substance.'- 2  In the principal case plaintiff used
the product for its intended purpose. The McClaren case is similar
factually, but the statute there does not specifically enumerate carbon
tetrachloride as requiring a label, while the North Carolina statute by
its terms seemingly requires a label for lead monoxide.13
Legislative purpose is heavily relied on by the court and it is cor-
rectly stated that the purpose of the act was to regulate the practice of
pharmacy.14  Not involving itself with the text of the statute, the court
devotes its attention to the context and title in reaching its conclusion.
If the statute applies only to the sale and labeling of poisons by phar-
macists, why does the statute contain clauses excepting lead dioxide,
lead carbonate, and colors ground in oil and intended for use as paint
from being labeled? The defendant offered perhaps the most plausible
explanation and one which plaintiff did not contest, viz., that "it is a
matter of common knowledge that paint dyes as we know them today
were undiscovered in 1905 and that drugstores generally sold the only
two paint pigments then available . . . 5
A more liberal construction of a similar statute was given in Stone
v. Shaw Supply Co.,16 where plaintiff was injured by yellow phosphorous
sold by defendant dealer (not a pharmacist) to one of plaintiff's friends,
who gave the substance to the plaintiff. Action was brought under a
statute making it unlawful to sell a deadly poison (which included
yellow phosphorous) to anyone not aware of its poisonous character.
Deciding against defendant's contention that the statute applied only
to pharmacy, the court said that the statute should be applied against
a dealer not a pharmacist in order to protect the public. Such an
approach seems much more realistic in effecting what the statute
ostensibly intends-the protection of public health.
Since there is no statutory remedy, the next question is whether
the plaintiff has a common-law remedy.' 7  Can plaintiff sue the manu-
1 37 F. Supp. at 308.
"3 See note 3 supra.
" N.C. Public Laws (1905), c. 108, §§ 20, 28, entitled, "An Act to Revise, Con-
solidate, and Amend the Pharmacy Law." N.C. Public Laws (1905), c. 108, § 2
reads, "That the object ... is to unite the pharmacists and druggists of this state
for mutual aid, encouragement and improvement, to encourage scientific research,
develop pharmaceutical talent, to elevate the standard of professional thought and
ultimately restrict the practice of pharmacy to properly qualified druggists and
apothecaries."
"Brief for Appellant, p. 18, Porter v. Yoder & Gordon Co., 246 N.C. 398, 98
S.E.2d 497 (1957).
"0 148 Ore. 416, 36 P.2d 606 (1934).
" If plaintiff could prove a cause of action for breach of warranty, he could
maintain such action against the manufacturer because of privity of contract be-
tween the parties, which North Carolina, in accord with the majority view, re-
quires. Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680 (1941);
Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). But see
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facturer for common-law negligence for failure to warn of the danger?
Generally a seller of inherently dangerous articles, known to be danger-
ous,' S is under a duty to warn of the danger by labeling or otherwise
conveying knowledge of the hazard to persons likely to be harmed.10
However, notice or warning of danger is not required where no danger
is reasonably to be anticipated because of the special knowledge or
experience of the user.20 In the principal case plaintiff was a college
graduate,21 an experienced paint contractor,22 and a buyer of paint
products from the defendant for years.23 It seems that plaintiff could
recover for common-law negligence only if a jury should find that an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man of his knowledge and experience
would not have known what litharge was.
Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 286, 63 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1951) (dictum), 30
N.C.L. REv. 191 (1952). But in this case there was no breach of warranty.
Since the goods were asked for by name, the only implied warranty is that of
merchantability, which means that the substance sold is reasonably fit for the
ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet. Giant Manufacturing Co. v. Yates-
American Machine Co., 111 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1940). 46 Am. Jua., Sales § 351
(1943) ; 77 C.J.S., Sales § 327 (1952). For convenient groupings of cases in this
regard see Annot., 59 A.L.R. 1180 (1929) ; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 410 (1934) ; Annot.,
135 A.L.R. 1393 (1941). In the principal case defendant would be liable for breach
of warranty only if the litharge were unfit for its ordinary use, and there was no
evidence to that effect. Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190,
293 P.Zd 26 (1956).
18 Guyton v. S. H. Kress & Co., 191 S.C. 530, 5 S.E.2d 295 (1939).
19 Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 285, 171 N.E. 639 (1930);
Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 352 Mo. 288, 177 S.W.2d 608 (1943); Corum v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 173 S.E. 78 (1933) (dictum); 65 C.J.S.,
Negligence § 100 (1950) ; RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 388 (1934) ; Dillard and Hart,
Product Liability, Directions for Use and Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145
(1955); James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 44, 192 (1956); Wilson,
Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. Rmv. 614, 809 (1955). Poisons are included within
the rule. McCrossin v. Noyes Bros., 143 Minn. 181, 173 N.W. 566 (1919). Sale
of the poisonous substance without labeling it as such must be the proximate
cause of injury. Levin v. Musser, 110 Neb. 515, 194 N.W. 672 (1923).
2 Howard Stores Corp. v. Pope, 1 N.Y.2d 110, 150 N.Y.S.2d 792, 134 N.E.2d
63 (1956); Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl. 1951);
Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923) ; Thrash v.
U-Drive It Co., 93 Ohio App. 451, 113 N.E.2d 650 (1951). RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 388 (b) (1934) requires that defendant have no reason to believe that those for
whose use the chattel is supplied will recognize its dangerous condition. Two
cases do not even require special knowledge of the buyer when the goods are asked
for by name. The court laid down the rule in Gibson v. Torbert, 115 Iowa 163,
88 N.W. 443 (1901), that when a person has reached the age of discretion and is
apparently in possession of his mental faculties and asks a druggist for a certain
drug, he impliedly represents to the druggist that he knows its qualities. Unless
there is something to indicate to the druggist that the purchaser cannot be safely
entrusted with the drug, the seller is not liable in damages for injuries to the
purchaser resulting from the improper use or handling of the article, no matter
how little knowledge the purchaser may in fact have had of its qualities. The
vendor's only duty, according to the court, is to supplv the buyer with the identical
substance asked for. Accord, Forney v. Sears. 153 Wash. 615, 280 Pac. 56 (1929).
"1 Transcript of Record, p. 116, Porter v. Yoder & Gordon Co., 246 N.C. 398,
98 S.E.2d 497 (1957).
22 Id. at 55. 23 Id. at 20.
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The unfortunate plaintiff in the principal case is without a statutory
remedy and probably without a common-law remedy. However, the
case can serve a much greater purpose than food for torts' thought.
Despite whatever logic there may have been in including the sale of
lead compounds used in paint under the "Pharmacy" caption of the North
Carolina General Statutes, section 90-77 is now in an anomalous posi-
tion. It would seem to be as much in the public interest and safety
to have legislation regulating the sale of lead compounds used as paint
ingredients as it is now for public safety that we have legislation regu-
lating the sale of insecticides, fungicides, and rodenticides.2 4 The only
existing regulatory legislation in the general area of paint products ap-
plies to the sale of linseed oil2 and turpentine.2 6  In view of the in-
herently dangerous quality of lead compounds used as paint ingredients,
the slight cost to the manufacturer in placing appropriate labels on con-
tainers,2 7 and the welfare of the public, it is submitted that the duty to
warn should be made statutory.
WILLIAM H. MCCULLOUGH
Wills-Devises and Bequests by Implication
In Finch v. Honeycutt' the testator declared in his will: "My estate
is a community estate2 with my wife Georgia Greer Honeycutt and has
been held as such for several years when paying Federal and State In-
come Tax.
"Therefore it is my will that my half of my and her (wife) estate be
given to my three children." 3  No further mention of the other half of
the estate was made anywhere in the will. Held, a half interest of all
the real and personal property of the deceased went to the wife in fee
under the will by virtue of the doctrine of devises and bequests by im-
plication.
In an earlier North Carolina case, Burcham v. Burcham,4 the testator
willed his wife "support" and expressed his desire that she should have
-'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.1 (1952). This is the insecticide, fungicide and
rodenticide act.
21 N.C. GELS. STAT. § 106-285 (1952).
- N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-303 (1952).
"The insecticide, fungicide, and rodenticide act requires the labeling of the
enumerated poisons with a skull and crossbones symbol and a "poison" label in red
letters against a differently colored background. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.3
(3) (1952). This would seem to be an appropriate label to place on containers of
lead compounds used as paint ingredients.
'246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957).
'The doctrine of community property is given effect in only seven states:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas. 41
C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 462(c) (Supp. 1957).
8 246 N.C. at 92, 97 S.E.2d at 480.
'219 N.C. 357, 13 S.E.2d 615 (1941).
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anything she wanted, and could live anywhere she wanted to, and have
a good time for the remainder of her life so long as she did not marry
again. The court found from these expressions of the testator that
his intent was that the entire property be used for his wife's benefit
during her lifetime or widowhood and found the inference so strong as
to necessarily give the widow a power of disposition.5
In another case, Efird v. Efird,6 the testator stated in his will that the
homeplace where he and his wife lived was owned by them as tenants
by the entirety, and that "upon my death . . . she will automatically
own" it. In fact, the testator owned the property individually. In later
sections of the will the testator made provisions to be carried out "after
the above properties shall have been given to my wife." (Emphasis
added.) The court said this language referred back to the testator's
previous statement that the wife would automatically own the home-
place at his death, and held that the will manifested an intent that the
homeplace should go to the wife.
In the principal case the testator made no reference to any part
of the estate that might be given or allotted to his wife. There were
no words sufficient to tie the testator's statement that his wife owned an
interest in the estate into an expression of intent that any interest should
pass to her under the will, as was found in the Efird case. If he were
under the impression that his wife owned half the estate in her own
right, then it appears illogical that he intended such half to pass to her
under his will.
A search of the authorities has revealed only a few holdings from
other jurisdictions on this issue. In In re Boehn's Will' the will
stated: "There are other pieces of real estate in my name only ....
However, the ownership of them represents the joint efforts of my
husband and myself in work, savings, improvement, care, and manage-
ment. It would be fair, I believe to consider and say that his interest
is half and mine half, and I so declare." The New York court held
that such declaration did not constitute a devise to the husband., The
court said that it would be absurd to find that the testatrix intended
to dispose of property which she declared she did not own.
In Hatch v. Ferguson0 the testator made a devise to his children of
5 The testator also made certain provisions for disposal of the property after
the wife's death.8 234 N.C. 607, 68 S.E.2d 279 (1951).
198 Misc. 994, 101 N.Y.S2d 812 (Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 1069,
121 N.Y.S.2d 766 (4th Dep't 1953).
8 101 N.Y.S.2d at 813-14.
9 See Williams v. Allen, 17 Ga. 81 (1855), where the court stated that recitals
by the-testator in his will that erroneously declared title to property to be in a
third person, which, in fact, belonged to the testator, did not amount to a devise or
bequest of such property by the will.1* 68 Fed. 43 (9th Cir. 1895).
(Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
all his estate, describing it as "being the one-half interest in the com-
munity property now owned by me and my said wife." It was found
that the testator owned the property individually, and the court held
that his descriptive language could only be regarded as the expression
of his opinion and did not convert the property into commnunity prop-
erty or operate as a devise of half thereof to his wife. The children
took all."
By the holding in the principal case it is apparent that the North
Carolina Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of devises and be-
quests by implication further than it had yet done. The result it reaches
is in conflict with the holdings of the jurisdictions discussed above. Yet
it seems that the result may well be the more desirable one, since it more
probably accords with the testator's intent as to whom the property
should go.
PAUL McMuRRAY
Workmen's Compensation-Injuries Sustained by Employee
While Going to and from Work
In Hardy v. Swall deceased, a thirteen year old boy, lived with
his family on the farm of. defendant under an arrangement whereby the
family paid no rent, but was allowed to occupy a house owned by de-
fendant in return for farm labor supplied by the family. Deceased lived
on the east side of a public highway which ran through defendant's farm,
and he had the duty of feeding defendant's livestock at a barn located
350 to 400 feet from his home on the west side of the highway. De-
ceased was required to feed the livestock twice a day and was paid
$1.50 per week for this service. On November 30, 1955, deceased had
crossed the highway, gone to the barn, fed the livestock, and was return-
ing to his home when he was struck by an automobile on the highway
and killed. Compensation proceedings were instituted.2 The Industrial
Commission found that the death was by accident rising out of and in
1 See Circuitt v. Perry, 23 Beav. 275, 53 Eng. Rep. 108 (Rolls 1856). Where
X willed all his real and personal property to Y but stated that on his death,
part of his father's property would, under his father's will, devolve upon his
nephews, when in fact the property then belonged to X, held, the property
of the father's estate did not pass to the nephews under X's will.
1246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (b) (1950) expressly excepts farm labor from the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but provides that if any employer
of farm labor has -purchased workmen's compensation insurance or insurance to
cover his compensation liability the employer shall be conclusively presumed, during
the life of the policy, to have accepted the provisions of the act. Defendant in
this case had such a policy which was active at the time of the death of the
decedent.
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the course of the employment 3 within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act 4 and granted compensation. On appeal this was
affirmed by the superior court and the supreme court.
The opinion recognized the general rule that an injury by accident
is not compensable if sustained by the employee while on his way to or
returning from the premises where the work of his employment is per-
formed." However, exceptions to this rule have developed in North
Carolina and compensation has been allowed where the employee was
going to or returning from the place of his employment if: the employer
either expressly6 or impliedly7 furnished a vehicle for that purpose; the
employer pays the expense of transportation ;S the employer provides a
method for transportation of the employees as an incident of the con-
tract of employment ;9 the employee was performing a "special mission"
' The court rejected the contention made by defendant that the employee was an
independent contractor. See McCraw v. Calvine Mills, Inc., 233 N.C. 524,
64 S.E.2d 658 (1951); Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1950).5 Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co. & Associates, 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943);
Lassiter v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 N.C. 227, 1 S.E.2d 542 (1939); Bray
v. W. H. Weatherly & Co., 203 N.C. 160, 165 S.E. 332 (1932) ; Hunt v. State,
201 N.C, 707, 61 S.E. 203 (1931); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 15.10 (1952); 8 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 1710 (1951).
' Phifer's Dependents v. Foremost Dairy, Inc., 200 N.C. 65, 156 S.E. 147 (1939).
Employer provided employee with a truck to be used for the purpose of going to
and coming from work. Employee was killed in a collision while on his way
from his home to the employer's plant. Compensation award was affirmed.
7 Smith v. Gastonia, 216 N.C. 517, 5 S.E.2d 540 (1939). Employee, a motor-
cycle policeman, was assigned a motorcycle with the understanding that he could
leave it at city hall or ride it home. Employee had made a practice of riding the
motorcycle home at night. On one such trip he was struck by an automobile
and killed. Held, compensation allowed. But see Alford v. Quality Chevrolet
Co., 246 N.C. 214, 97 S.E.2d 869 (1957) (an unreasonable interval of time lapsed
between employee's departure and his trip home so that no compensation was
awarded, even though employer had furnished employee an automobile for the
purpose of coming to and going from the place of employment).
8 Puett v. Bahnson Co., 231 N.C. 74, 58 S.E.2d 633 (1950). Employer paid
automobile expenses and employee drove his own car to the place of employment.
An accident occurred on one such trip and employee was injured. The award of
compensation was affirmed. But see Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707, 161 S.E. 203
(1931) (compensation was not allowed when the employer only paid employees
wages during the trip, and employee paid his own automobile expenses). The
question of injuries sustained by an employee while using public transportation
at the employer's expense has not arisen in North Carolina.
'Edwards v. T. A. Loving Co., 203 N.C. 189, 165 S.E. 356 (1932). Employer
furnished a truck which picked the employees up and transported them from their
homes to the place of employment. Employees were entitled to use the convey-
ance by virtue of their contract of employment. Employee was allowed compensa-
tion when injured while on the conveyance being transported to work. But see
Lassiter v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 N.C. 227, 1 S.E.2d 203 (1931) (com-
pensation was refused when the transportation was furnished gratuitously or as
a mere accommodation). See also Mion v. Atlantic Marble Co., 217 N.C. 743, 9
S.E.2d 501 (1940). Employer-provided conveyance was overcrowded. Employer's
foreman gave employee the option of "crowding in" or riding with another em-
ployee .who had driven his own car for personal convenience. Employee chose




at the request of the employer ;1o the employee makes use of the streets
after the hours of his regular employment in the performance of a duty
connected to the employment, as shown by an established custom."
The question presented in the Hardy case was one of first instance
in North Carolina and, by affirming the award of compensation, the
court aligned itself with other jurisdictions which on one of several
theories have allowed compensation in specific instances for street in-
juries12 and closely analogous railroad crossing injuries sustained by an
employee while going to or coming from work.13 Most of the cases have
adopted the theory that if the point at which the injury occurred, even
though it is not on the premises of the employer, lies on the only route,
or at least the normal route, which the employees must traverse to reach
the place of employment, then the hazards of that route become the
hazards of the employment.14 The North Carolina Supreme Court
'* Massey v. Board of Education, 204 N.C. 193, 167 S.E. 695 (1933). Claimant
was employed as a janitor at a rural school and had been instructed by the principal
to stop by a grocery store and purchase cleaning supplies. Claimant left his home
on the way to work and was crossing a street to the grocery store when he was
struck by an automobile. Compensation award affirmed. But see Davis v. North
State Veneer Corp., 200 N.C. 263, 156 S.E. 859 (1931). The employee made a
voluntary "special errand" during his off duty hours, and it was held that injury
occasioned when the employee was struck by an automobile and killed while on
this mission was not an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.
See also Wilkie v. Stancil, 196 N.C. 794, 147 S.E. 296 (1929).
"1Hinkle v. Lexington, 239 N.C. 105, 79 S.E.2d 220 (1953), 32 N.C.L. REV.
372 (1954). Employee was a cemetery keeper for the city. His duties were to
care for the city cemeteries, to cut the grass, sell cemetery lots, dig graves, remove
surplus dirt, and perform such other duties as were incidental to the position of
cemetery keeper. It was his custom nearly every evening, and had been for
many years, to visit the funeral homes of the city to learn if any graves were to
be dug, funerals arranged, or cemetery lots sold. On the night of his death
employee had finished his duties at the cemetery and set out on his usual rounds
from his home to the funeral homes, but in crossing a street he was struck by an
automobile and killed. Compensation was awarded on the ground that the injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment.
" Canoy v. State, 113 W.Va. 914, 918, 170 S.E. 184, 186 (1933), is closely
analogous to the Hardy case. In the Canoy case the employer operated a mine,
with the mine site located on one side of the highway and housing owned by the
employer located on the other side. An employee was killed by an automobile as
he crossed the highway while returning from his day's work at the mine. Com-
pensation was allowed. The court stated, "[W]e are of the opinion that the
use of the place of injury at the time thereof is shown to have been within the
course of and resulting from the employment of claimant's decedent, by an express
or implied requirement of the contract of employment of its use by the workman in
going to and returning from his work." It was shown that crossing the road
was the only method by which the employee could reach his home.
' A somewhat related problem, on the question of the extent of coverage
afforded "travelling employees" under the workmen's compensation laws, is the
subject of a Note appearing in 23 N.C.L. REv. 159 (1944).
"Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 184 Cal. 300, 184 Pac. 1 (1919);
Jaynes v. Potlach Forest, Inc., 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016 (1954) ; Fennimore v.
Union Constr. & Holding Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 33, 35 A.2d 32 (1943); 1 LARSON,
WORKMfEN'S COMPENSATioN LAw § 15.13 (1952). Two Utah cases, Bountiful
Brick Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 68 Utah 600, 151 Pac. 555 (1926), and Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 207 Pac. 148 (1922), are based
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recognized, but refused to adopt this theory in Bryan v. T. A. Loving
Co. & Associates.115 A second theory for allowing compensation in the
going and coming cases is based upon the concept that the premises of
the employer should be extended for a "reasonable time and distance"
to afford the employee protection after he has come within the "zone"
of employment.16 This theory is troublesome in its application and
gives inconsistent results, as there is no established basis for deter-
mining what is a reasonable distance. 17 The third theory allows com-
pensation whenever the employee is injured by employment hazards
which extend beyond the premises of the employer.' 8 The fourth theory
on this theory. In both cases the employee was killed as he crossed a railway
track in order to reach his employer's premises. From a judgment in each case
awarding compensation, appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court,
where the cases were heard as Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928),
and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923), respectively. The
cases were appealed on the ground that an award of compensation in these cir-
cumstances was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution. The court rejected this contention, and in
affirming the holding of the Parramore case said: "Here the location of the plant
was at a place so situated as to make the customary and only practicable way of
ingress and egress one of hazard. Parramore could not, at the point of the
accident, select his way. He had no other choice than to go over the railway
tracks in order to get to his work; and was in effect invited to do so. And this
he had to do regularly and continuously as a necessary concomitant of his employ-
ment, resulting in a degree of exposure to the common risk beyond that to which
the public generally was subjected." Id. at 426. The Giles case was also affirmed
even though there were other routes of entrance available.
'-222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751 (1943). The employee, who worked as a guard
at the gate of a marine base, arrived at work on a bus which discharged him
across the highway from the entrance. He was killed by an automobile as he
attempted to cross to the gate. A part of the employee's duties included directing
traffic in the highway during rush hours. The court specifically held that de-
fendant's premises did not include the street where the employee sometimes worked.
In reversing the judgment awarding compensation the court held that the em-
ployee was subjected to no more extraordinary risk than any other person using
the highway. Cf. Guient v. Mathieson Chemical Corp., 41 So. 2d 493 (La. App.
1949). In the Bryan case the court discussed Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, supra
note 14, as precedent but rejected that case on the grounds that: (1) the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act makes injuries arising out of or in the course of
employment compensable, whereas the North Carolina Act requires the injury to
arise out of and in the course of the employment, and that because of this differ-
ence the Utah courts interpreted "in the course of" the employment to include "a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to be done"; and (2) the United States Supreme
Court only decided that the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act as so applied
does not contravene the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
" Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932) (this
case was also rejected in the Bryan case on the grounds that it was in direct
conflict with prior North Carolina decisions) ; Leatham v. Thurston & Braidich,
264 App. Div. 449, 35 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1942); Industrial Comm'n v. Barber, 117
Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
"' Compare Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., supra note 16, in which the
employee was "immediately" outside of the entrance to the employer's premises
and preparing to enter, with Boles v. Service Club, 208 Ark. 692, 187 S.W.2d
321 (1925), where employee was 31 feet from the entrance.
nFreire v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P.2d 809 (1941). This
was a common law action in which employee wvas injured by a taxicab in a
[Vol. 36
NOTES AND COMMENTS
allows compensation where the employee travels along or across a public
road between two portions of his employer's premises, whether going or
coming or pursuing his active duties.19 The reasoning here is that once
the employee has come onto the premises of the employer he is within
the scope of his employment and subject to the control of his employer.
Thus if while in the performance of his duties he is required to cross
a highway or railroad track which runs through his employer's premises
he does so as an incident of the employment, and if injured while negoti-
ating the hazard, then such injury is within the scope of his employment
and compensable.2 0  This theory, apparently the one adopted in the
Hardy case,21 has been applied in allowing compensation in cases where
an employee is injured while crossing a highway or railroad track which
separates the employer's plant from company owned housing22 or from
a parking lot2 3 maintained by the employer for the convenience of the
employees. But in Horn v. Sandhill Furniture Co.24 the employee was
public street while on the way to work. As the traffic congestion was created
by vehicles and persons which had come to do business with the employer, it was
held that the employee's exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. The argument of the Freire case is based on much the same reasoning
as was rejected in the Bryan case. In the Bryan case the hearing commissioner
found that more than 90% of the traffic where employee was working was com-
posed of employees of defendant employer and other workmen who were erecting
the marine base and that employee was subjected to an extraordinary and greater
hazard of being injured by an automobile than that to which the public generally
was subjected or that was common to the neighborhood. This reasoning was
adopted by the full Industrial Commission, which found that the employee was in
the "ambit" of his employment and affirmed the hearing commissioner. The
supreme court rejected this argument and held that on the contrary, he was at
the time on the way to his place of employment. The Freire case, cited in the
opinion, was held to be factually distinguishable, as the hazard in that case was
created by other employees of the company as such and not as members of society
at large. See also 1 LARsoN, WoRKmEN's COmpENSATioN LAW § 15.31 (1952).
" Kuharski v. Bristol Brass Corp., 132 Conn. 563, 46 A.2d 11 (1946); 1
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATiON LAW § 15.14 (1952).
20 Corvi v. Stiles & Reynolds Brick Corp., 103 Conn. 449, 130 Atl. 674 (1925);
McMillin v. Calco Chemical Co., 157 N.J. Misc. 68, 188 Atl. 694 (1936) ; Texas
Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 125 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). See
also Meissner v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 271 App. Div. 1041, 68 N.Y.S.2d 507
(Sup. Ct. 1947). Employee slept in one building owned by employer and worked
in another. He was killed as he crossed a street between the two buildings. The
award of compensation was affirmed in a per curiam opinion on the grounds that
an "inference" could be drawn that decedent was "in the precinct of his employ-
ment" when the accident occurred. Compare, supra note 18, "precinct" as used in
this case with "ambit" in the Bryan case, and "zone" in Barnett v. Britling Cafe-
teria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932). All of these terms are used by the
courts to denote instances where the compensation laws are broadened beyond
the premises of the employer.
"1 In the Hardy case the court, though citing American Law Reports notes,
did not cite specific cases from other jurisdictions, and for that reason it is difficult
to ascertain the exact theory adopted, but the case seems to fit in this category.
22 See note 12 supra.
23 Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329,
170 P.2d 18 (1946) ; McCrae v. Eastern Aircraft, 137 N.J. Misc. 244, 59 A.2d 376
(1948).
2' 245 N.C. 173, 95 S.E2d 521 (1956).
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injured while crossing a public highway which separated the employer's
plant from a parking lot which was owned by the employer and used
by the employees with its consent. Compensation was refused on the
grounds that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the
employment, as the employee's duties as a laborer in the plant did not
require him to be in the highway at the place where the automobile
struck him.
25
The decision in the Hardy case is another, but it is believed reason-
able, step in the general trend26 of broadening the concept of injuries
arising out of and in the course of the employment. It does not abrogate
the rule regarding injuries sustained by employees while going to and
coming from the premises of the employer, but allows an exception
which is not so broad as to open a gap which would let in a flood of
other "off the premises injuries cases."
GILEs R. CLARK
21 In the Horn case employee was injured as he crossed the street to eat his
lunch which he had left in his automobile. He was not paid during his lunch
hour and the court held that he was on a "personal errand" at the time of his
injuries. If going to and from the place of employment for lunch is not to be
distinguished from going to and from work in general, it would seem that the
holding of this case is somewhat weakened by the holding of the Hardy case.
"Probably the best example of this trend is found in two Idaho cases. In
State ex rel. Gallet v. Clearwater Timber Co., 47 Idaho 295, 274 Pac. 802 (1929),
employee was killed by a train as he attempted to cross a railroad track lying
across the only road giving access to the employer's plant. Compensation was
denied on the grounds that employee was not on the premises of the employer
at the time of his death, but rather was coming to work, and as he had not
actually reachecf the premises he had not come into the area where protection was
given. In Jaynes v. Potlach Forest, Inc., 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016 (1954), a
similar accident happened at the same location. The court in allowing com-
pensation expressly overruled the Gallet case declaring that changing trends in
the workmen's compensation law justified such a change.
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